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Abstract 
The breakdown of the Argentine currency board in early 2002 produced a 
number of obituaries that often quite rashly declared the country’s monetary 
constitution since 1991 the main responsible for its recent near-catastrophic 
economic collapse. Contrary to such rather one-sided negative ascriptions to 
the currency board system, the intention of this paper is to give a 
comprehensive and balanced description of the currency board model in 
theory, as well as to name its functioning conditions under today’s economic 
and political conditions prevailing in developing and transforming countries. It 
will become clear that the success of a currency board in terms of lasting 
stabilization of an economy not only depends on its initial design (e.g. the 
choice of the anchor currency, of the exchange rate, the legal and institutional 
fixings) but also on an ongoing process of economic and institutional reform 
that extends from a general macroeconomic and especially public sector 
streamlining to banking sector reforms, product and labour market 
deregulation, and to a general realignment of the economy towards export-
orientation and international competitiveness. The extent to which these 
reforms are tackled and completed decides over the degree to which the 
economy is able to absorb real shocks without incurring high economic and 
social adaptation costs, hence over the degree to which a country is able to 
benefit from the currency board’s strengths without falling victim to its 
potentially severe weaknesses. 
Along with some basic reflections about the concept and motivation of 
modern currency boards, sections 1-3 give a brief overview over the historical 
background of the currency board idea as well as of its implementation. 
Section 4 focuses on the constitutional elements of a currency board, while 
section 5 provides the core of the discussion of pros and cons of currency 
boards, depicting the system’s strengths and weaknesses as well as the 
conditions under which they materialize. Section 6 will discuss under which 
circumstances a currency board is a good choice for a country, and ask 
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whether less strict stabilization policies might be able to deliver the hoped-for 
benefits less costly. Some problems related to the questions of duration and 
termination of currency boards are addressed in section 7. Finally, section 8 
will give a brief exposition of the idea of dual currency boards as a theoretical 
extension of the currency board model which promises to eliminate one of the 
biggest immanent threats to a currency board. 
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1 The Currency Board Idea 
 
The costs of following a sensible monetary rule are the price to pay 
for the bad reputation that stems from a past of broken trust 
and for the future economic development that regaining credibility 
will eventually bring about. (Carlos E. Zarazaga1) 
 
1.1 What is a Currency Board? 
1.1.1 The Term 
It is important to be aware that the term “currency board” 2 originally 
describes the institution in the place (but not with all the tasks) of a central 
bank. A currency board in this narrow sense is nothing more than a monetary 
authority that issues money, keeps reserves, and on demand exchanges 
domestic currency against reserves at a fixed rate. The naming originates 
from the early days of currency boards when they were introduced as such 
institutions in British colonies in the 19th century, mostly established without 
any formal legal protection, and mainly relying on a long tradition of financial 
rectitude3. 
In the course of history and with the evolution of monetary theory, the 
institution has lent its name to the monetary constitution of a country with a 
currency board. In this wider sense, a currency board comprises the legal 
framework of the monetary system as well as all the institutions that 
                                     
1 Zarazaga (1995b), p. 21. 
2 The correct German translation would be “Währungsausschuss”, “Währungsrat”, or 
“Währungsamt”, although the English term is used nearly exclusively even in German 
literature. For Argentines, in contrast, the term “currency board” generally sounds 
unfamiliar; their currency board was generally referred to as “la convertibilidad” (from the 
name of the corresponding law “Ley de Convertibilidad”), simply meaning “convertibility”. 
3 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), p. 44. 
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implement it. The discussion of a currency board in this sense extends to a 
discussion of a whole economic system4. To make this perception more clear-
cut, some authors use terms like “currency board system” or “currency board 
arrangement” for this wider meaning of the term. This paper uses the term 
currency board in both senses, i.e. as the institution’s as well as the monetary 
constitution’s name, according to the context of discussion. 
Also, some authors distinguish between currency boards that in all details 
follow the orthodox design (then called “currency boards”) and currency 
boards that deviate from the orthodox concept in one or several respects, i.e. 
have somewhat modified rules (called “currency board-like systems”, or 
“quasi-currency boards”)5. Since most present and all “modern” (i.e. 
introduced in the second half of the 20th century) currency boards include at 
least some modifications as compared with the “pure” design6, this distinction 
shall not be made here, i.e. the term currency board shall comprise both 
orthodox and modified currency boards. With the chosen terminology this 
paper sticks to the most widespread use in economic literature as well as 
political discussion. 
1.1.2 The Concept 
A currency board can be defined as a special case of a rules-based 
monetary system7. Like every rules-based system, it is designed to avoid 
                                     
4 See Fuhrmann (1999), p. 86. 
5 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), p. 46, and Zarazaga (1995b), pp. 16-7. 
6 The only orthodox currency boards still in operation are those of the Falklands, the 
Cayman Islands, and Gibraltar. As Dolmas and Zarazaga state, today no independent 
country operates an orthodox currency board. See Dolmas/Zararaga (1995a), p. 1. 
7 Recommendable general literature about currency boards comprises: Balino/Enoch 
(1997), Bennett (1994), Enoch/Gulde (1997), Enoch/Gulde (1998), Freytag (1998), 
Fuhrmann (1999), Fuhrmann/Richert (1995), Ghosh/Gulde/Wolf (1998), 
Gulde/Kähkönen/Keller (2000), Hanke (2000), Hanke/Schuler (2000), Humpage/McIntire 
(1995), O.V. (1997), Roubini (1998), Schuler (1992), Schuler (1998), Walters (1989), 
Williamson (1995), Zarazaga (1995a and c). 
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losses incurred by discretionary decision-making, and to gain from enhanced 
credibility through rules-governed politics. A currency board’s main feature is 
the nominal anchor in the form of a legally fixed exchange rate, tying the 
domestic currency to a reserve currency8. This nominal anchor plays a pivotal 
role in the design not only of the monetary constitution, but also of the fiscal 
and structural disposition of a currency board country. As will become clear, 
with this legally fixed nominal anchor, a country undergoes severe self-
restrictions in the use of policy tools. 
The rule that governs the system is very simple: the monetary authority 
(the currency board) is allowed to issue domestic currency only against 
reserves at the fixed exchange rate. These reserves may consist of a foreign 
currency or of other external reserve assets. The reserves requirement 
implies that the domestic monetary base (notes and coins in circulation) 
always is 100% backed by reserves9. Increases in the monetary base can 
occur exclusively via corresponding increases in foreign reserves. Being 
subject to this rule, the monetary authority is deprived of some of the most 
important traditional central bank functions such as monetary regulation and 
lender of last resort activity. Furthermore, in tying money issue to existing 
reserves, deficit financing via the printing press is excluded, which is why 
fiscal policy in a currency board country is subject to hard budget constraints. 
The main motivation for the adoption of a currency board is to produce 
price stability, especially in developing countries with long histories of inflation 
and devaluation, and in economies transforming from centrally planned to 
                                     
8 The nominal anchor could also consist of two reserve currencies (as will be 
discussed in the section about dual currency boards), or a basket of currencies, or even 
include a peg to a reserve currency with some variability (e.g. a pre-announced crawl), as 
Williamson (1995) states. These options have until now stayed purely theoretical, and the 
notion of a nominal anchor for a currency board has generally always implied a fixed peg to 
one reserve currency. 
9 As is important to note, the 100% reserves requirement applies only for the monetary 
authority, and is not imposed on commercial banks. 
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market economies, both of which typically face the need to adopt strong 
institutional constraints on their ability to inflate10. As the combat of inflation 
not only requires policy measures but, far more important, their credibility, a 
currency board is designed to bring about a maximum of credibility of 
monetary policy. A stable currency will bring about lower interest rates: 
inflation as well as interest rates in a currency board country are supposed to 
approach the levels prevailing in the reserve currency country. Further effects 
of the choice of an exchange rate-based nominal anchor emanate from the 
requirement to earn reserves, hence to open up the economy and to strive for 
export-led growth. This in turn provides stimuli for fiscal, financial and 
structural real sector reforms11. 
Although a currency board is based on a very simple and transparent rule, 
a variety of different elements can govern its design. Indeed, pure currency 
boards in reality rarely existed; most countries have modified “orthodox” 
design elements in order to reflect local necessities or to gain a limited degree 
of flexibility. E.g., in many currency boards the minimum reserves may be less 
than 100% (thereby allowing them limited credit against monetary liabilities), 
whereas others prefer to keep backing at above 100% (in order to gain some 
flexibility and reserves for limited lender of last resort operations). While 
bringing about some flexibility in monetary policy, such modifications generally 
bear a risk to the currency board’s sustainability because they introduce 
discretionary power and therefore potentially reduce its credibility. 
These considerations illustrate the central conflict inherent in the currency 
board idea, namely that between credibility and flexibility of the system. This 
conflict regularly shapes discussions about costs and benefits of currency 
boards, in theory as well as in practice. Another source of dispute is raised by 
the question of whether and when to view a currency board as a merely 
                                     
10 This is the motivation for modern currency boards. The background of the 
introduction of colonial currency boards is different, as will be sketched in the section about 
the historical development of currency boards. 
11 See Fuhrmann/Richert (1995), p. 1039. 
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transitional or as a longer-term arrangement. Although possible exit options 
may be considered before setting up a currency board, their explicit pre-
determination (via escape clauses) might again risk an undermining of its 
credibility from the beginning. 
1.2 Currency Board vs. Other Fixed Exchange Rate Arrangements 
A currency board is a special type of a fixed exchange rate arrangement. 
On the spectre of possible exchange rate regimes, which extends from the 
one extreme of freely floating exchange rates to the other extreme of definitely 
fixed exchange rates under a monetary union, the currency board is located 
between the less strict regime of fixed exchange rates (exchange rate pegged 
by commitment to an anchor currency, i.e. reversible at any time), and the 
stricter regime of official dollarization (predominant or exclusive use of a 
foreign currency as legal tender). Hence, short to official dollarization, a 
currency board is the most extreme option of exchange rate pegging a single 
country can chose12. 
Official dollarization13 is the closest relative to the currency board as it 
implies the same motivation and principle of importing the anchor’s stability, 
and requires the same disciplined macroeconomic and structural policies. 
Accordingly, the strengths and weaknesses of dollarization equal those of a 
currency board, with the main difference being the higher degree of 
irreversibility of the former. The gains of dollarization in terms of transparency, 
                                     
12 Participation in a monetary union requires bi- or multilateral agreement. 
13 Unofficial dollarization prevails when residents extensively use a foreign currency (in 
most cases the dollar) alongside or instead of the domestic currency, and/or hold foreign 
currency notes or bank deposits to protect against high inflation in the domestic currency. 
Official dollarization occurs when a government adopts a foreign currency as the 
predominant or exclusive legal tender. 
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credibility, monetary stabilization, and impetus for fiscal discipline therefore 
are supposed to exceed those of a currency board14. 
Although a currency board also has much in common with a regime of 
conventional fixed exchange rates, the distinction between the two (besides 
the wider discussion of fixed vs. floating exchange rate regimes, which shall 
not be extended here15) is directly relevant for the understanding of the 
motivation and the rationale of a currency board. As with the relation between 
dollarization and currency board, the main advantage of a currency board 
over a system of purely fixed exchange rates is its higher implicit credibility16. 
This is mainly the effect of the high legal and procedural obstacles (often 
equalling the requirements for constitutional changes) in the way of 
modification or abolishment of the system, built-in to signal the high degree of 
self-commitment of the government17. Under purely fixed exchange rates, in 
contrast, changing the exchange rate is a simple administrative matter, and 
expectations of such a change can by themselves bring about the expected 
change. 
Clad in legal hurdles, the higher credibility of a currency board is made up 
by the legally fixed and publicised self-restriction in the use of policy tools, 
mainly the exclusion of unbacked money issue. This precludes fiscal policy 
relying on the note press to finance budget deficits, and requires sound fiscal 
and monetary policies. Time inconsistency and credibility problems of 
                                     
14 The two main shortcomings of dollarization as opposed to a currency board are that 
it requires the sacrifice of a country’s own money, hence of a symbol of national 
sovereignty, as well as of any seigniorage income, as far as no bilateral agreement with the 
anchor country to share seigniorage income is sought. See Alesina/Barro (2001), p. 383, 
for some thoughts on possible compensation schemes between anchor and dollarized 
country. 
15 For a brief discussion of fixed vs. floating exchange rates see e.g. Hanke/Schuler 
(2000), pp. 67-8. 
16 See Alesina/Barro (2001), p. 382. 
17 See Eichengreen (1996), p. 238. 
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discretionary and/or (by self-commitment) rule-bound policies, though not 
extinguishable by a currency board, are reduced under a currency board as 
compared to a system of conventionally fixed exchange rates. The unwritten 
law of a currency board is, however, that the subordination of monetary and 
fiscal policy to the preservation of the fixed parity requires the acceptance of 
its costs, e.g. of prolonged periods of high interest rates or bankruptcies in the 
financial sector. 
However, even constitutions can be changed, and credibility depends as 
much on attitudes as on rules and institutions. The simple self-commitment to 
a fixed exchange rate of one government may be as credible (or even more 
credible) as the legal exchange rate fixed by another, not complying, 
government under a currency board scheme. Credibility of behaviour has to 
add to the credibility of rules. Even for an established and stable currency 
board, a trade-off between rules and discretion similar to that of a 
conventional central bank may arise, e.g. in the question of the use of excess 
reserves18. 
1.3 Currency Board vs. Central Bank 
Typically, a currency board operates in place of a central bank19. Like the 
latter, it is a government-owned body separate from the ministry of finance, 
and has the monopoly of issuing notes and coins. A currency board, however, 
does not have the high degree of discretionary power a typical central bank 
today has. The powers and functions of both institutions differ fundamentally. 
The stylised T-accounts of both institutions offer an appropriate starting point 
for the discussion. 
In its orthodox form, a currency board issues base money (cash, i.e. notes 
and coins denominated in domestic currency) solely in return for the reserve 
                                     
18 See Zarazaga (1995b), pp. 19-20 
19 A currency board can also operate as a parallel issuer alongside an existing central 
bank, although such cases have been rare and do not exist today. See Schuler (1998), p. 
1. 
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currency at the fixed exchange rate. Its balance sheet comprises on the 
liability side the amount of base money issued, and the net worth, i.e. 
reserves exceeding the amount of issued money20. 
Sometimes, (unorthodox) currency boards also accept deposits of 
commercial banks or issue securities, both of which are subject to the same 
foreign reserve requirements as its notes and coins. In this case, the liabilities 
side also comprises those deposits. To simplify the exposition of the currency 
board, this section assumes the orthodox type, i.e. a currency board that 
issues notes and coins exclusively21. 
The asset side of a currency board consists solely of reserve currency 
holdings. These reserve holdings are directly related to the balance of 
payments position of the country, as reserves are acquired through current 
account surpluses and/or net capital inflows. Since money issue is tied one-
to-one to the foreign reserves position, the monetary base varies with the 
variations in the balance of payments: a balance of payments surplus leads to 
an increase in the foreign reserves position and subsequently, other things 
equal, to an increase in the base money (and via the money multiplier, the 
                                     
20 This difference (the net worth of a currency board) is usually maintained in a certain 
proportion in order to guard against the risk of a decrease in the market value of the 
assets. As the reserves of a currency board are legally required to be highly secure and 
liquid, this margin does not have to be high. In most cases, where the net worth exceeds 5 
to 10 percent of the money issue, it has to be transferred to the government by law. See 
Williamson (1995), p. 3. 
21 The addition of deposits and securities does not significantly change the analysis if 
they are interchangeable for their holders and subject to the uniform foreign reserve 
requirement. See Hanke/Schuler (2000), pp. 7 and 43. 
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money stock)22. Conversely, a shrinking money base is the consequence of a 
balance of payments deficit23. 
 
Figure 1: Balance Sheet of a Currency Board 
Assets Liabilities 
Liquid reserve currency assets Notes and coins 
 (Deposits of commercial banks) 
 Net worth 
 
In the long run, monetary growth in the currency board country 
approximates the monetary growth rate of the reserve currency country, as 
can be illustrated with the simplifying notion that, for a currency board country 
to acquire reserves, the reserve currency country has to issue more money 
than its public wishes to hold. This effectuates decreasing interest rates and 
rising prices in the reserve currency country, which in turn creates arbitrage 
opportunities and leads to a deficit in the reserve currency country. This deficit 
mirrors a balance of payments surplus in the currency board country, which 
causes its money supply to rise. Note that this adjustment process is 
completely automatic and includes no discretionary action by the currency 
board24. 
The balance sheet of a typical central bank differs from a currency board’s 
balance sheet in two main points. First, on the liability side, there are notes 
                                     
22 Hence, money supply under a currency board works in the same way as it does 
under a gold (or gold exchange) standard in which the central bank does not sterilize 
movements in reserves. 
23 Note that a currency board country does not have to maintain current account 
surpluses to expand the money stock. Net capital inflows may more than compensate for a 
current account deficit and allow for monetary expansion as well. 
24 As Humpage/McIntire put it, the currency board country trades the loss of monetary 
sovereignty to the reserve currency country against the credibility and stability imported 
from the reserve-currency country. See Humpage/McIntire (1995), p. 5. 
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and coins as well as deposits of commercial banks, the sum of both 
constituting the monetary base, M0. Again, the net worth of a central bank 
balances the difference between assets and liabilities. 
On the assets side, a central bank holds liquid reserve currency assets, 
needed to manage the exchange rate, be it pegged or floating. Unlike a 
currency board, it is typically not required to hold a fixed ratio of foreign 
reserves to liabilities25. More important, besides those foreign reserves, a 
central bank also holds domestic assets. These domestic assets consist 
above all of government debt, but may also comprise commercial bank or 
even state industry debt. As in the case of foreign reserves, a central bank 
normally buys domestic assets against money, i.e. increases in the monetary 
base. It may in this way finance fiscal deficits through money creation. It may 
also buy domestic assets to prevent the monetary base from shrinking, e.g. 
when it has to sell foreign assets to support the exchange rate, i.e. it can 
sterilize unwanted contractionary effects on the monetary base26.  
 
Figure 2: Balance Sheet of a Central Bank 
Assets Liabilities 
Liquid reserve currency assets Notes and coins 
Domestic assets Deposits of commercial banks 
 Net worth 
 
                                     
25 There may be binding minimum ratios, but a central bank may hold any ratio in 
excess of these. 
26 As Humpage/McIntire point out, this power to sterilize may be an advantage in the 
case of temporary balance of payments imbalances. If, however, the underlying causes of 
a balance of payments deficit are of structural and long-term nature, sterilization can 
worsen capital outflows, nourish speculations of devaluation, and aggravate the situation. 
In such cases, the discretionary power of a central bank provides no advantage over the 
rule-bound currency board. See Humpage/McIntire (1995), p. 5. 
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As pointed out, a currency board has no discretion in monetary policy: it 
sells and buys foreign currency against domestic money according to the 
needs of the private sector, i.e. it acts completely passively. A central bank, in 
contrast, has the discretionary power to change the monetary base not only 
through foreign exchange transactions but also through the purchase or sale 
of domestic assets. It has also the power to change the exchange rate, to 
alter the foreign reserves ratio, or the regulations for commercial banks, 
powers that are inexistent for a currency board27. 
The discretionary power of a central bank includes lender of last resort 
activities to bail out banks in stress and so prevent or mitigate financial crises. 
Such lender of last resort activity is largely precluded for a currency board (or 
at least limited to a degree that is made possible by excess reserves 
earmarked for this purpose). This limitation makes a sound banking system a 
significantly more vital interest under a currency board than under a central 
bank. 
A currency board relies on a legally or even constitutionally fixed 
exchange rate. Central banks may operate under pegged or floating 
exchange rates, with pegged exchange rates typically not defined by law, and 
being subject to alterations at the will of the central bank or government. 
A typical currency board does not regulate commercial banks. In most 
cases, it is the ministry of finance or a separate regulating office that passes 
banking regulations. Central banks, in contrast, often regulate commercial 
banks. The most basic form of regulation is the imposition of reserve 
requirements, according to which commercial banks are required to hold 
reserves in certain proportions of their liabilities at the central bank. Such 
reserve requirements are not imposed on banks under an orthodox currency 
board. Since the currency board does not guarantee the convertibility of bank 
deposits into notes and coins, commercial banks themselves are, in the 
                                     
27 See the sections discussing monetary policy options of non-orthodox currency 
boards. 
 Stabilization via Currency Board 14 
 
absence of reserve requirements, responsible for holding enough notes and 
coins to be able to satisfy their depositors’ conversion requests28. 
A currency board receives interest from its assets (reserves invested in 
highly liquid and secure foreign currency assets), but it does not pay interest 
on its liabilities (notes and coins issued). This interest income represents the 
currency board’s gross profit (gross seigniorage). The deduction of the 
expenses of issuing notes and coins and of maintaining them in circulation 
generates the currency board’s net profit (or net seigniorage)29. A central bank 
earns seigniorage from interest surpluses as well; they stem both from foreign 
and domestic assets. However, the most important source of seigniorage for a 
central bank may be inflation, caused by discretionary increases in the money 
supply30. As already pointed out, a currency board cannot create inflation, 
which is why this source of seigniorage is inexistent for a currency board. 
Since a currency board is a very simple institution with very few and 
closely circumscribed functions (issue of notes and coins and their conversion 
on demand, based on strict rules), its activities are transparent and easy to 
monitor. A central bank, in contrast, has discretion in its activities and is by 
itself a market participant and speculating institution, which is why its actions 
often are opaque or even sometimes need secrecy to be successful. 
The rule-bound and transparent nature of a currency board makes it a 
politically sterile institution, whereas a central bank is, or may be, prone to 
political pressure, even if formally independent. The rules and transparency of 
a currency board give it a high degree of institutional credibility, which a 
central bank has not. The credibility of a central bank can at best be built up 
                                     
28Put in the terms of monetary aggregates, under a currency board, M0 is backed 
100% by foreign reserves, whereas broader measures of money supply, such as M1, M2, 
and M3, are not. 
29 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), pp. 61-2. 
30 For a concise definition of the so called “inflation tax” earned by a central bank see 
Roubini (1998), pp. 11-13. 
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over years and decades through self-commitment and conduct, but there is no 
built-in credibility to begin with. 
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2 Excursus: Doctrinal History and the Currency Board Idea 
A review of the main characteristics of the century-old debate over 
competing monetary theories and their opposing policy advices delivers 
valuable insights for the understanding of the ideological background of the 
currency board idea. 
Much of the history of monetary theory reflects the struggle between the 
opposing mercantilist and classical camps. They lent their respective 
arguments to the views the Anti-Bullionist and Bullionist, later the Banking and 
Currency School adherents brought forward in the 19th century. Since then, 
depending on the economic problems prevailing at a time, the two camps 
have alternated in dominating the discussion. When unemployment was seen 
as the main problem, mercantilists with their prescription of cheap money to 
stimulate real activity have tended to prevail, whereas classicals with their 
view of inflation as a purely monetary phenomenon were dominant in times 
when price stability was the main concern. Even today, mercantilist and 
classical views continue to compete for the more accurate explanation of the 
function of money and corresponding policy advices. 
The following section will summarize the basic elements of this debate, 
focussing on the standpoints of mercantilists and classicals, and extending 
them to the famous English Banking-Currency controversy of the nineteenth 
century. While the debate continued and appeared in new editions in the 
twentieth century under Keynesian vs. monetarist flags, the early 
controversies already include the central aspects that are relevant for the 
understanding of the theoretical background of the currency board idea and of 
its supposed benefits as well as its drawbacks. It will become clear that the 
paradigm behind the currency board idea is directly derived from classical 
quantity views of money31. 
                                     
31 Indeed, the first proposal in the 20th century to install a “modern” currency board 
came from John Maynard Keynes, then a Ricardian, who in 1918 designed a currency 
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2.1 Doctrinal Positions: Mercantilist vs. Classical Views 
The mercantilists’ views take their origin in the pre-classical era of the 16th 
to 18th century32. Two outstanding proponents were John Stewart Law and Sir 
James Steuart. Their main argument was that a nation’s wealth was 
constituted by its stock of precious metals. Countries without natural 
resources of precious metals (mainly gold) would have to accumulate their 
wealth through foreign trade. Accordingly, the mercantilist policy prescription 
included protectionist policies in order to achieve a permanent trade balance 
surplus matched by corresponding inflows of specie from abroad33. This 
prescription was based on an anti-quantity theory of money which held that 
(1) money stimulates trade, (2) price-level and inflation are determined by real 
cost-push forces, (3) the interest rate is a purely monetary variable, 
determined solely by supply and demand of money and indicating the degree 
of scarcity of money, (4) cash not used for trade purposes is absorbed in idle 
hoards, (5) the money stock is endogenous, i.e. prices and real activity 
determine the amount and/or velocity of circulating money, so that the money 
stock passively adapts to the needs of trade, (6) overissue of money is 
impossible when money is backed by the nominal value of real property (land 
or commercial papers), and (7) discretion is superior to rules in the conduct of 
monetary policy. 
Contrary to the mercantilists’ proposition of wealth, classicals held that the 
wealth of a country consisted in its productive resources such as land, labour 
and capital, as well as in the efficiency of their use. Both Adam Smith and 
David Ricardo stated that an optimal allocation of resources was best 
achieved via free trade rather than via mercantilist protectionism, thereby 
realizing comparative advantages resulting from specialization and division of 
                                                                                                                           
board with a sterling-backed rouble for war-ridden and inflation-plagued North Russia. See 
Hanke (2000), p. 52. 
32 For an overview over the mercantilist vs. classical debate, see Humphrey (1998). 
33 See Spahn (2001), pp. 63-8. 
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labour. Classical monetary theory held that trade balance surpluses could not 
be permanent, as a country’s additional specie would raise domestic prices, 
thus diminishing exports and stimulating imports until trade balance 
equilibrium would be restored (David Hume called this the “price-specie-flow-
mechanism”). Similarly, according to the classical view, scarcity of money 
could not exist, since a country’s trade could be driven with any quantity of 
money, on the ground that prices ultimately adjust proportionately to any 
change in the money stock.  
Cost-push theories of inflation were rejected, as price increases were 
exclusively seen as resulting from increases in the money stock. Any rise of 
factor costs, e.g. of wages, would make labour-intensive goods more 
expensive, thereby reducing expenses for capital-intensive goods, which 
would lead to a cheapening of the latter. In the classical view, cost-pushes 
lead to a change in relative prices rather than to general inflation. 
The mercantilist “money stimulates trade-doctrine” was shown by the 
classicals to be valid at best in the short run. Changes in the money stock in 
their view could initially affect output and employment because of the 
stickiness of prices (prices fail to adjust immediately due to imperfect 
information of price-setters) and because of distribution effects (additional 
money is initially concentrated in few hands and disperses only gradually). 
Eventually, however, prices would adjust fully to the new money stock and 
output would return to its initial level, so that, in the long run, money would be 
neutral. 
Discretion in monetary policy was deemed to be destabilizing: the 
classicals doubted the knowledge and motivation of policy authorities. They 
advocated rules in order to stabilize real activity and to facilitate automatic 
adjustment mechanisms. One such rule was the gold standard: with a fixed 
currency price of gold and an assumed fairly steady gold price of goods, 
money prices of goods could be stabilized, and money could reliably function 
as unit of account and medium of exchange, rather than providing a source of 
financial crisis, as the mercantilist prescription would do in the classical view. 
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The mercantilist fear of deficient aggregate demand was – in classicals’ 
eyes – unfounded. They argued that the act of production itself included the 
remuneration of factors, and thus the creation of the incomes necessary to 
buy the products off the markets. Factor incomes would either be spent or 
saved, with saving, via its translation to investment, eventually also leading to 
spending. In this way, each supply would create its own demand34. 
Permanent underemployment of resources could not occur in their view. 
Classicals saw the interest rate as a real magnitude determined by 
productivity rather than as a merely monetary phenomenon. Accordingly, 
monetary control could not permanently influence the “natural” rate of interest. 
An increase of money supply could initially depress the loan rate of interest, 
but, as prices started rising, loan demand would also rise, which eventually 
would lead to higher interest rates again. 
Finally, classicals argued that John Law’s recommendation of a nominal 
backing of money through a linkage to the nominal value of real assets would 
render prices indeterminate, as random shocks raising prices of the assets 
would lead to monetary expansion, which itself could bid up asset prices 
again, and so on. Price stability in their view required a different principle of 
monetary limitation. 
Table 1 summarizes the key points of discussion in the mercantilist vs. 
classical debate that constituted the base of the famous Banking-Currency 
controversy. 
 
Table 1: Mercantilist vs. Classical Doctrines 
 Mercantilists Classicals 
Source of wealth Precious metals Productive resources 
Prescription to achieve 
wealth 
Protectionism in order to 
achieve permanent 
trade balance surpluses 
Free trade in order to 
achieve optimal 
allocation of resources 
                                     
34 This is Jean Baptiste Say’s “law of markets”. 
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Nature of money Money stimulates trade Money is neutral 
Determinants of prices Real cost-push forces Stock of money 




by changes in the supply 
of money 
Real magnitude, not 
susceptible to monetary 
changes 
Excessive money Absorbed in idle hoards, 
not causing inflation 
Causing prices to rise 
proportionately 
Determination of the 
money stock 
Endogenous (causality 
running from prices and 




running from the 
exogenously set money 
stock to prices) 
Overissue of money Impossible (“real bills 
doctrine”) 






2.2 The Bullionist and Banking-Currency Controversies 
2.2.1 The Early 19th Century Bullionist Controversy 
The Bullionist controversy emerged in the early 19th century focussing on 
the question of whether paper money should be convertible into gold on 
demand. This debate later led to the so-called Banking-Currency School 
controversy of the 1840s, which again laid the ground for a debate over the 
nature of money that in many ways is still continuing today. 
In the United Kingdom of the 18th century, private banks issued banknotes 
that circulated as money35. These notes included a claim on gold bullion held 
                                     
35 For a detailed historical description and analysis of the Bullionist Controversy, see 
Laidler (1989), as well as Spahn (2001), pp. 69-83. 
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by the bank. The conversion of paper money to gold was granted at any time 
since banks issued notes on the basis of gold reserves they actually held in 
their vaults. 
At the end of the 18th century, a major bank run occurred in Britain 
following rumours of the landing of French troops on English soil. Customers 
hurried to their banks and demanded conversion of their notes into gold 
bullion. The British government subsequently averted a major banking crisis 
by allowing banks to suspend convertibility temporarily. Since convertibility 
was not restored immediately36, banks continued issuing notes without 
respecting their convertibility into gold. 
These events triggered an intellectual debate among lawyers, bankers, 
and statesmen over the question of whether convertibility into gold should be 
maintained or not. The “Bullionist” group demanded convertibility whereas the 
“Anti-Bullionists” argued for the maintenance of the prevailing status of 
suspension. 
The Bullionists37 argued with the temptation for banks to “overissue” notes 
without the duty to grant convertibility. This would lead to an excess supply of 
money, hence to a cheapening of money and to inflation. The Anti-
Bullionists’38 argument was based on the mercantilist “real bills doctrine”, 
stating that banknotes were issued by banks against merchants’ bills of 
exchange, i.e. according to the “needs of trade”. Provided that the repayment 
of these bills was secure, there could be no excess issue of banknotes since 
they merely accommodated real transactions. Even if excess issue should 
happen, excessive banknotes would eventually return to the banks in 
exchange for deposits or gold or in the repayment of loans, as the so-called 
“reflux principle” brought forward by the Anti-Bullionists held. Thus, inflation 
could never be the result of any excess issue39. 
                                     
36 Convertibility remained suspended from 1797 to 1821. 
37 Famous Bullionists were Henry Thornton, John Wheatley, and David Ricardo. 
38 Leading Anti-Bullionists were Richard Torrens, Bosanquet, and James Mill. 
39 See Laidler (1989), p. 64. 
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History first seemed to support the Bullionists: the early 1800s saw a 
period of inflation, peaking in 1814. Anti-Bullionists saw in it the result of 
government purchases during the Napoleonic wars. The Bullionists argued for 
a resumption of convertibility, which was eventually restored in 1821. 
However, during 1815 to 1830, a prolonged period of deflation was recorded 
in the wake of the end of the Napoleonic wars. Thus, historical evidence was 
far from clearly supporting one of the views. 
2.2.2 The 1840s Banking-Currency Controversy 
The restoring of convertibility in 1821 had raised the question on whether 
the note issue of the convertible gold-standard currency required further 
regulation to prevent overissue. The predecessors of the Currency School – 
the Bullionists – had argued that such control was not necessary. Overissue 
would lead to domestic price increases, making British goods more 
expensive, which in turn would lead to increased conversion into gold in order 
to buy the relatively cheaper foreign goods. The ensuing drain on gold would 
force banks to restrict their issue, causing the money stock to contract and 
prices to fall to the initial level, and eventually give halt to the gold drain. 
Convertibility had been seen as its own guarantor. 
However, history seemed to contradict this position: several monetary 
crises in the 1820s and 1830s had shown that the classical adjustment 
mechanism was far from self-correcting. Pure convertibility still had left banks 
with discretion in the trade-off between safety and profits since they faced no 
minimum reserve ratio. This had led to continued note issue in spite of 
concomitant gold outflows and to subsequent violent contractions sending 
monetary shocks throughout the economy. 
The Currency School proponents therefore concluded that banks’ 
discretion in the note issue should be removed. Their proposal was to require 
a one-for-one change in issue with the change in gold reserves, and thereby 
to realize the “principle of metallic fluctuation” for a mixed (paper and coin) 
currency. Overissue, which via the balance of payments mechanism and the 
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gold drain could threaten convertibility and create procyclical fluctuations, in 
their eyes could be prevented with this rule. 
The debate seemed to be brought to an end by the Banking Act of 1844 
which installed a fractional convertibility: for a fixed amount (equalling the 
amount of circulating money), one third of the value had to be covered by 
gold, whereas new issues of banknotes had to be 100% covered by gold40. 
The act also installed a monopoly of note issue, and split the Bank of England 
into a note-issuing Issue Department and a deposit-taking Banking 
Department41. The gold reserve requirement intended overexpansion to be 
corrected automatically, instantaneously and smoothly. It embodied the direct 
policy application of the classical price-specie-flow-mechanism. 
The Currency School supported the act as it limited the amount of note 
issue, and thus in their opinion prevented inflation. Leading supporters of the 
Currency School42 revived the Bullionists’ arguments. Proponents of the 
Banking School43 argued against convertibility. Their argument was that in 
reality banks issued notes according to the needs of trade (“real bills 
doctrine”), and that a possible overissue would instantaneously return to the 
banks (“law of reflux”), and thus contained its self-correction. Changes in 
prices and production in their view required banks to accommodate varying 
loan demands via corresponding variations in their note issue. Expansion in 
the note issue therefore was seen as the result rather than the cause of price 
                                     
40 The amount of 14 billion pounds, equalling two thirds of the estimated money in 
circulation, was regarded as the “hard core” of circulation that would probably never return 
to the banking system, and was not subject to the convertibility requirement. Apart from this 
unbacked amount, any note issue had to be fully backed by gold reserves. See Schuler 
(1992), pp. 10-1. 
41 See Spahn (2001), pp. 80-3. 
42 They included Lord Overstone, James R. McCulloch, Thomas Joplin, Samuel M. 
Longfield, and former Anti-Bullionist Richard Torrens. 
43 Famous Banking School adherents were Thomas Tooke, John Fullarton, and the 
young John Stuart Mill. 
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inflation. In addition to the concepts of cost inflation, reverse causality, and 
passive money, further mercantilist propositions completed their anti-quantity 
theory of money: (1) excess specie reserves are absorbed in idle hoards 
without affecting the amount of money in circulation, so that gold drains in 
international gold flows can solely be fed by corresponding reductions in 
excess reserves, (2) the causes for gold drains are not to be sought in 
domestic inflation, but rather in real balance of payments shocks, (3) changes 
in the money stock are compensated by changes in the stock of money 
substitutes, so that the total circulation remains unchanged, with the effect 
that any control of the volume of gold and notes is impossible, and (4) 
discretion is superior to rules in monetary policy, for rigid rules prevent banks 
from responding flexibly to changing needs of trade and to financial crises.44. 
In the aftermath of the 1844 Banking Act, convertibility had to be 
suspended three times45, lending some credibility to the Banking School’s 
arguments. However, gold parity to note issue was generally maintained until 
World War I. 
2.2.3 Findings with Hindsight 
The Banking-Currency School debate and the ensuing historical 
experience in retrospect revealed several findings. First, the Currency 
School’s prescription of a control of the volume of gold and notes failed 
insofar as it did not include the control of deposits, which formed a growing 
part of the circulating medium46. Therefore, since there was no reserve 
requirement for deposits, even after 1844 banks possessed significant room 
for discretionary control over deposits. Second, Currency School proponents 
                                     
44 A third, mostly neglected, group of participants in the debate was the Free Banking 
School, which favoured a system of free competition of banks including in the field of note 
issue, and which accordingly denied the need (and usefulness) of a central bank. See 
Schwartz (1989), pp. 44-46. 
45 In 1847, 1857, and 1866. 
46 See e.g. Spahn (2001), p. 84, and Schuler (1992), p. 11. 
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refused to recognize the necessity of lender of last resort rescue in coping 
with financial panics. By the end of the nineteenth century it was widely 
accepted that liberal lending was the best way to deal with internal drains, 
which were caused by panic-led demand for gold and Bank of England 
notes47. 
On the other hand, the Banking School’s real bills doctrine, which claimed 
that note issue tied to loan demand for productive purposes would prevent 
inflation, always suffered from not being able to close its open front: the 
sequence of rising production prices, correspondingly rising loan demand and 
note issue to finance the same level of real transactions was indefinite – 
inflation justified the monetary expansion necessary to sustain it. The real bills 
criterion failed to limit the quantity of money in existence48. 
2.3 The Currency Board and Classical Monetary Theory 
The above outline of the century-old debate identifies the currency board 
idea as a clearly classical one49. With the currency board’s main targets of 
disinflation and stabilization, pursued via self-restriction in monetary (and, 
effectively, fiscal) policy, its location within the doctrinal spectre is evident. 
Although direct reference to the Currency School’s ideas was rare in the 
official documents setting up early colonial currency boards, the historical 
analysis of the debates surrounding them leaves no doubt about their 
intellectual origins50. 
                                     
47 The Bank of England accepted the doctrine of the lender of last resort in 1890 
following the Baring Brothers crisis. See Schuler (1992), p. 12, and Spahn (2001), p. 86. 
48 See Schwartz (1989), p. 43. 
49 This is also made clear by Sir John Hicks, who describes the currency board idea as 
a direct product of classical monetary theory developed by David Ricardo: „On strict 
Ricardian principles, there should have been no need for central banks. A currency board, 
working on a rule, should have been enough.” Hicks (1967), pp. 167-8. 
50 See Schuler (1992), pp. 8-12. 
 Stabilization via Currency Board 26 
 
Partly anticipating the following chapter, it is telling to review the fate of the 
currency board idea since its origins, as it goes in parallel with the history of 
economic thought, and with the development of political powers implementing 
it. Up to the 1950’s, industrialised nations by and large kept to the gold 
standard, and imposed ideologically corresponding monetary constitutions, 
currency boards, on their colonies. Growing independence of colonial 
territories, the stress and eventual abandonment of the Bretton Woods 
system, and the surge of Keynesian thought all played major roles in the 
decline of the currency board idea since the 1950s. The ensuing decades-
long inflation and deficit spending experience of industrialised and developing 
countries alike triggered the surge of classical monetary theory and the 
primacy of price stability in the 1980s. Classical monetary theory has since 
largely set the tone in monetary policy in industrialised as well as developing 
countries. The financial experience of countries that had departed from 
currency boards without being able to install credible alternative monetary 
policies, however, proved to be dismal51. This experience, complemented by 
the breakdown of the Soviet bloc and the emerging transformation task for its 
economies, prepared the ground for a renaissance of the currency board idea 
in the 1990s, which, despite the near-catastrophic collapse of Argentina’s 
currency board in early 2002, still seems to be lasting. 
                                     
51 Walters ascribes their degeneration to a large part to the abolishment of currency 
boards: “It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the financial instability brought in train by 
the abrogation of the currency board system has played a considerable role in this 
process.” Walters (1989), p. 110. 
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3 From Colonial to Present-Day Currency Boards 
3.1 Rationale of Colonial Currency Boards 
Currency boards were first established and got most widespread in British 
colonies in the 19th century. While a currency board had been proposed for 
the Province of Canada as soon as 184152, the first currency board to be 
introduced was that of Mauritius, in 1849. The design of the currency boards 
was implicitly based on the ideas of the Currency School. According to one 
contemporary, currency boards were meant to “unite the ‘advantages of 
cheapness and convenience which belongs to a paper currency’ with the 
‘steadiness and uniformity of value, of a metallic currency, … [thus, they] 
ought to be so regulated that the amount in circulation should vary according 
to the laws which govern the latter’.”53 
Before the establishment of currency boards, notes and coins of the 
imperial power were used in the colonies, where they served as a stable 
means of exchange and as a store of value. These were in most cases issued 
locally54, by chartered colonial or imperial banks, which were granted the right 
to issue Bank of England notes. However, their note issue was limited by legal 
restrictions in the maximum amount and in the denomination of notes. This 
caused frequent (and artificial) note shortages in some colonies. Economic 
theory and government policy of the time regarded those restrictions as 
necessary, and were opposed to unrestricted issue for fear of inflation. 
                                     
52 See Schuler (1992), p. 14. 
53 Earl Grey, British Secretary of State for the Colonies, cited after Gunasekera (1962). 
See Balino/Enoch (1997), p. 2. 
54 Walters assumes that Bank of England notes were issued only in Britain, with the 
consequence that the risk of loss or destruction of notes in the colonies and the 
complications of replacing worn notes delivered a major argument for the establishment of 
currency boards. See Walters (1989), pp.109-10. 
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Regulated, monopolistic issue by a monetary authority, the currency board, 
seemed to provide the solution55. 
Hence, the main motivation for the establishment of currency boards was 
to give the colonies a monetary framework that provided stability of currency, 
and that eased monetary, trade-related transfers between imperial power and 
colony56. Moreover, with currency boards, the colonies were given a certain 
degree of independence by granting them their own, locally issued, currency, 
as well as the source of income from seigniorage, which was obtained by 
investing reserves in interest-bearing, secure, and sufficiently liquid assets. 
Early currency boards differed from later currency boards in several 
respects. Initially, British currency boards redeemed their notes in gold or 
silver coins only. The West African currency board, introduced in 1913, was 
the first to redeem in pound sterling, and with this became the prototype for 
later (also non-British) currency boards, all of which adopted the sterling (or 
other currency) exchange standard57. Another difference between earlier and 
later currency boards refers to the type of assets allowed as reserves. Most 
early currency boards were allowed to invest in foreign, i.e. imperial or other 
non-colonial, government securities, but not in securities of their own colony. 
Later, currency boards were typically allowed to hold local securities up to a 
certain degree, which meant a deviation from the strict currency board design 
towards more central bank-like options58. 
                                     
55 See Schuler (1992), pp. 13-4. 
56 E.g., a money transfer from the colonial power (Britain) to the colony basically works 
as follows: the payer in Britain deposits reserve currency notes with the Bank of England, 
which again deposits them with the currency board in the colony. The currency board 
changes the notes into the local currency at the fixed parity and pays them out to the payee 
(or the payee’s branch bank). This transaction causes the money supply in the colony to 
expand by the transferred amount. A payment from the colony to Britain works in reverse, 
causing the colonial money supply to shrink. 
57 See Schuler (1992), p. 18. 
58 See Schuler (1992), pp. 35-6. 
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3.2 Currency Boards Since 1849 
Shortly after the introduction of the first colonial currency board on 
Mauritius in 1849, the New Zealand currency board was established in 1850, 
followed in the late 19th and early 20th century by many Asian, African and 
Middle Eastern currency boards59. Besides in almost all British colonies all 
over the world, currency boards also operated in Argentina (1902), the 
Philippines (1903), then a U.S. colony, and Panama (1904). Later non-British 
currency boards include North Russia (1918)60, Danzig (1923), Ireland (1928), 
Somalia (1950), Lybia (1950), Sudan (1957), North Yemen (1964), and 
Swaziland (1974). In French colonies, systems similar to currency boards 
were put in place (the so-called “Instituts d’Emission”), notably in the still 
existing CFA-Zone, which consists of West and Central African countries in 
Currency Union, with the CFA-franc linked to the French franc. 
The currency board system reached its greatest extent in the 1950s. By 
then, currency boards operated in approximately 50 countries, most of them 
(former) British colonies, among them the economically important territories of 
Hong Kong and Singapore, as well as New Zealand. After the 1950s, the 
currency board system experienced a swift decline. By 1974, it had shrunk to 
10 countries, again nearly all existing or former British colonies. The reason 
for this decline was that most territories with currency boards, after having 
gained independence, quickly sought to underline their independence by 
creating their own sovereign currency and installing central banks. This trend 
was also fed by the conviction, prevailing among economists and politicians at 
the time, that monetary arrangements with central banking better fit a 
country’s economic, especially development, needs, and were superior to the 
                                     
59 Schuler (1992) gives a comprehensive study of the history of currency boards, also 
containing a complete list of currency boards (excluding currency boards established after 
1990), pp. 107-12. 
60 Interestingly, this currency board was instigated by John Maynard Keynes, and 
installed by the British Treasury. See Williamson (1995), p. 5. 
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currency board system, which then was perceived as rather antiquated61. In 
the period between 1974 and the 1990’s, the only newly established currency 
board was that of Hong Kong, installed in 1983 and still operating today62. 
The 1990’s, finally, saw a renaissance of the currency board idea. This 
revival was closely related to the acknowledged quality of currency boards to 
bring about currency stability. Currency boards were no longer seen as 
monetary constitutions adequate for dependent economies, but were rather 
perceived as a means to provide stability for countries that suffered major 
structural and political breaks, as well as for developing countries with long 
records of political and economic instability. The breakdown of the Soviet 
Union and the emergence of a number of new economies in the former East, 
as well as the independence of post-war Ex-Yugoslavian countries, yielded 
constellations in which the currency board idea gained new attraction. 
Among the transforming countries of the former Soviet block, Estonia 
introduced its currency board in 1992 (backed by the German mark, now the 
euro), Lithuania followed in 1994 (first backed by the US-dollar, since 2002 by 
the euro), and Bulgaria in 1997 (German mark, now euro). Bosnia and 
Herzegovina introduced their new currency, linked to the German mark, now 
euro, under a system resembling a currency board in 1998. 
Among the inflation-plagued developing countries, Argentina was the sole 
to introduce its (latest) currency board in 1991, with the objective to stop 
hyperinflation and to open its hitherto closed economy63. This is the only 
recent case of a currency board that had to be abandoned under stress in 
early 2002. Further Latin American countries recently chose a similar, if 
                                     
61 At the time, currency boards were even regarded by some as manipulative monetary 
mechanisms of colonialism or neo-imperialism. See Walters (1989), p. 111. 
62 Hong Kong gave up its second currency board, which had been established in 1945, 
in 1974. 
63 In Argentina, currency boards had already been operating from 1902 to 1914, and 
from 1927 to 1929. 
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stricter, path through outright dollarization (as did Ecuador in 1999 and El 
Salvador in 2001). 
Today, currency boards are operating on the Bermudas, the Cayman 
Islands, the Falkland Islands, in Gibraltar, on the Faroe Islands, in Brunei 
Darussalam, Djibouti, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Hong Kong. Systems 
resembling currency boards are operating in the Eastern Caribbean, the CFA-
Zone, in Singapore, Latvia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina64. 
Furthermore, during the 1990s, economists recommended to introduce 
currency boards for countries such as Mexico (after the 1995 crisis), Peru, 
Brazil, and Russia. 
                                     
64 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), pp. 41-2. 
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4 Constitutional Elements of a Currency Board 
4.1 Anchor Currency 
The choice of the anchor currency should be guided by several 
considerations. First, the anchor currency should be selected among stable 
currencies with deep and developed financial markets that offer a broad range 
of international financial instruments. The anchor currency therefore should be 
one of the few large international reserve currencies65, which include the 
dollar and the euro (with the yen being a further, but recently questioned 
candidate). A long record of low inflation, high credibility, full convertibility, and 
low real interest rates are the qualities that make them likely to continue their 
good performance. With the choice of a stable anchor currency, the currency 
board country strives to import the stability of the chosen reserve currency. 
Within this set of possible anchor currencies, the most important criteria 
centre around the question of which reserve currency is best able to shelter 
the currency board country from real shocks inside and outside the currency 
area. This is a crucial question, since the currency board country is deprived 
of monetary policy options to deal with such shocks and therefore has to 
minimize these risks as far as possible. The best choice of anchor currency is 
given when (1) as many countries as possible, whose enterprises compete 
with those of the currency board country, share the peg to the reserve 
currency, i.e. form a single currency area with the reserve currency, when (2) 
a high proportion of the external trade of the currency board country takes 
place with the reserve currency country, and when (3) the production patterns 
of the currency board country differ significantly from those of the reserve 
currency country. As Freytag (1998)66 shows, within these three criteria, the 
                                     
65 Few currency boards have chosen other than one of the international reserve 
currencies. This happened mostly for historical reasons, e.g. in the case of Brunei that is 
pegged to the Singapore dollar. See Enoch/Gulde (1997), p. 4. 
66 See Freytag (1998), pp. 5-11. 
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requirement of a high proportion of bilateral trade with the reserve currency 
country seems to be the least indispensable, i.e. if it is not met, the damage 
caused by real shocks is smaller than if another of the three is not met67.  
Expected future shifts in trade patterns should be taken into consideration 
as well when choosing an anchor currency. While a basket of reserve 
currencies might best reflect the trade patterns of a country and might provide 
a better shelter against external shocks, its disadvantages in terms of minor 
transparency and higher obstacles to credibility as well as higher transaction 
and management costs make it rarely seem a preferable option for a currency 
board country68. 
Finally, the domestic acceptance of the reserve currency may also provide 
an argument for the choice of the anchor currency. An economy already 
penetrated by a parallel currency that is highly valued among market 
participants might decide to choose this currency as its anchor even if trade 
patterns would predict a different anchor currency. Such a constellation could 
again provide a case where the missing criterion of strong trade connections 
with the reserve currency country would not provide a sufficient argument 
against the choice of an anchor currency that otherwise meets the above 
criteria. 
                                     
67 Suppose for this purpose a positive productivity shock in the reserve currency 
country with a subsequent appreciation of the reserve currency. Worst would be the effects 
for the currency board country if production patterns in the currency board country did not 
differ much from those in the reserve currency country, but the criteria of strong trade 
connections with the reserve currency country and a large currency area pegged to the 
reserve currency were given: a large part of external trade of the currency board country 
would suffer. If, however, the criterion of strong trade connections with the reserve 
currency country were missing, but the other two were given, the pressure of such an 
external shock would be significantly smaller (also smaller than under the third possible 
constellation, a large currency area missing) since only small parts of the currency board 
country’s exports would be affected by the appreciation. See Freytag (1998), pp. 10-1. 
68 See Williamson (1995), p. 24. 
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The implications of the choice of reserve currency for the reserve country 
are also worthwhile considering. If the reserve currency has already been in 
wide use in the currency board country, the demand for it will probably 
decrease with the successful introduction of the currency board since people 
now can safely change their reserves into domestic currency. At the same 
time, the demand of commercial banks might rise as a consequence of 
reserve requirements or intensified capital flows, so that the net effect may be 
unclear. However, most currency board countries are small in economic 
terms, and the typical reserve currency economies are big and their 
currencies in global use, so that the initial monetary effect of a currency board 
on the reserve currency country usually will be small69. 
4.2 Fixed Exchange Rate 
The determination of the exchange rate is an important as well as difficult 
issue. Doubtlessly, the “appropriate” exchange rate is ideally identical with the 
exchange rate determined by market forces70. However, an undervalued 
exchange rate (as compared to the appropriate exchange rate) potentially 
entails several advantages: (1) The amount of foreign exchange needed to 
provide full backing of the monetary base is reduced, and (2) a built-in 
“cushion” of undervaluation can be designed to compensate ex ante for an 
expected real exchange rate appreciation during the initial phase of the 
currency board, and so to protect the currency board from a preventable 
overvalued exchange rate from the beginning. (3) Finally, an undervalued 
exchange rate may facilitate exports (although the question of a competitive 
exchange rate is seldom an issue in a country adopting a currency board with 
                                     
69 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), p. 55. 
70 Where the market rate is not clearly detectable, e.g. because of restricted foreign 
exchange markets, a brief period of unrestricted floating of the domestic currency may 
precede the determination of the exchange rate in order to have an indication for the 
unrestricted market rate. 
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the typically preceding accelerating inflation and devaluation cycles71. On the 
contrary, the consideration that too expensive imports might hamper a 
modernization of the economy might again speak against an undervalued 
exchange rate72). 
An appreciation of the real exchange rate in the early phase of a currency 
board is likely to occur because of four facts. (1) A certain degree of inflation 
inertia will persist during the first months after introduction of a currency 
board, which is produced by lags in the adaptation of expectations of market 
participants and by structural rigidities (e.g. backward-looking indexation 
clauses, or overlapping contracts)73. (2) Concomitant measures at the time of 
fixing the exchange rate, such as price liberalizations, may produce price 
effects and prevent inflation from immediately going down to the level 
prevailing in the reserve currency country. (3) The growth rate in the currency 
board country may exceed that in the reserve currency country, which causes 
demand for labour, goods, and services, and hence their prices, to rise. (4) 
Net inflows of capital may increase demand and create inflationary pressure74. 
However, there are drawbacks of the tempting option to fix the exchange 
rate at an undervalued level. The most important is that by starting the 
currency board with an over-depreciated exchange rate, the credibility of the 
arrangement might be reduced from the beginning. The choice of a parity that 
is significantly below the prevailing exchange rate therefore bears the risk of 
giving an impulse to domestic inflation, which by itself would re-establish the 
previous real exchange rate. 
Full foreign exchange backing can not only be obtained through the choice 
of a depreciated exchange rate, but also through a variation in the definition of 
                                     
71 See Bennett (1994), p. 190. 
72 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), p. 49. 
73 See Williamson (1995), p. 21. 
74 See Freytag (1998), pp. 4-5. 
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reserves used75, as well as in the definition of currency board liabilities to be 
backed76. Hence, for a country lacking reserves, the choice of the exchange 
rate most likely involves a trade-off between a per se highly credible full 
covering of a broad set of domestic liabilities through a narrow set of reserves 
(with the concomitant, credibility-risking high degree of devaluation), and a 
less credible wider definition of reserves that back a narrower definition of 
liabilities (which necessitates a smaller devaluation)77. The decision whether 
and to which degree excess reserves for limited lender of last resort 
operations should be held from the beginning is closely connected and 
basically faces the same credibility conflict78. A feasible way to achieve the 
necessary foreign exchange backing may be to allow for international 
reserves being gradually built up or even to borrow the missing reserves 
through a medium- or long-term foreign loan. With strong underlying policies, 
the commitment to build up full reserve cover over time may be credible 
enough to grant sustainability of the regime. 
A country adopting a currency board has to bear in mind that each detail 
deviating from the orthodox architecture of the currency board bears a 
potential to diminish its credibility and to evoke speculative attacks, so that 
costs and benefits have to be carefully appreciated. This is especially true for 
such an obvious and transparent issue as the degree of reserve backing. 
While some economists completely reject the adoption of a (however slightly) 
undervalued exchange rate79, it is certainly prudent to say that the degree of 
initial overdepreciation in setting the parity should be tightly limited in order to 
achieve maximum credibility while allowing for a small margin of inflation 
                                     
75 Foreign exchange reserves can be specified net or gross, and can include or 
exclude long term debt. 
76 They may include solely currency in circulation, or (in the case of an unorthodox 
currency board) additionally deposits at the currency board. 
77 See Enoch/Gulde (1998), p. 5. 
78 See Bennett (1994), p. 201. 
79 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), p. 49. 
 Stabilization via Currency Board 37 
 
inertia, but addressing structural problems as far as possible directly instead 
of indirectly via the exchange rate level. 
4.3 Full Convertibility 
A currency’s function as a medium of exchange depends on its 
convertibility. There are different degrees of convertibility: (1) Cash 
convertibility means the ability of a currency to exchange bank deposits for 
notes and cash on demand. (2) Commodity convertibility is the ability of a 
currency to buy domestic goods and services. (3) Foreign exchange 
convertibility comprises the unrestricted ability of a currency to buy foreign 
goods and services, including foreign currencies. 
A currency with all three types of convertibility has full convertibility. Most 
currencies of developed countries are fully convertible, while most developing 
countries have currencies with restricted convertibility. The most typical 
restrictions of foreign exchange convertibility refer to capital account 
transactions (the purchase of foreign financial assets), whereas current 
account transactions (the purchase of foreign goods and services) are 
generally less restricted. The arguments for capital controls centre around the 
fears of capital flight or on the contrary of massive foreign investment that 
increases domestic prices of nontraded goods and reduces the 
competitiveness of domestic exporters, and around the fear of moral hazard 
for domestic banks and industries that rely on a bail-out by the government 
through devaluation in the case of unsustainable capital burdens through 
foreign debt80. 
Full convertibility is a constitutional element of a currency board because it 
is the precondition for the creation of a complete substitutability between local 
and anchor currency, for the reduction of country and currency risk premia, 
and hence for the successful import of stability81. To underline its commitment 
to full convertibility, a currency board should keep its exchange window open 
                                     
80 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), pp. 21-2. 
81 See Fuhrmann/Richert (1995), p. 1035. 
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for anyone, including the public, and not impose any minimum or maximum 
exchange amounts. It should demonstrate that it stands ready under all 
circumstances to exchange currency board notes into the reserve currency. 
The currency board should not charge commission fees for the exchange, and 
keep trading spreads at zero or minimal, in order to minimize barriers to 
capital movements and arbitrage, and to keep the link to the reserve currency 
as close as possible82. 
Unlimited convertibility does not mean that a currency board is responsible 
for the conversion of deposits denominated in local currency into currency 
board notes and coins, nor for their conversion into the reserve currency. This 
is the responsibility of banks. The currency board itself is only concerned with 
the convertibility of the notes and coins it issues83. 
While in some cases an immediate establishment of full convertibility 
(including full capital account convertibility) may be possible, other cases may 
require a more gradualist approach. This may be necessary when the banking 
sector is very fragile, and when revealed illiquidities and insolvencies of banks 
under the rigid system of a currency board might trigger ban runs. The 
purchase of domestic currency might then be restricted to the use for current 
account transactions, and it might be required that foreign exchange earnings 
be kept in the country84. In such cases, the process of adjustment to monetary 
disequilibria has to work over trade volumes and current account effects, an 
adjustment that is less smooth and rapid than over capital flows. In the course 
of stabilization and strengthening of the financial sector, ongoing liberalization 
of capital transactions will be facilitated in order to allow for a closer 
adaptation to the lower reserve country interest rates and for a maximum 
degree of substitutability between local and anchor currency85. 
                                     
82 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), pp. 58-9, as opposed to Enoch/Gulde (1997), pp. 21-3. 
83 See Schuler (1998), p. 2. 
84 See Bennett (1994), p. 202. 
85 See Enoch/Gulde (1997), pp. 25-6. 
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4.4 Conduct of Monetary Policy 
In its purest form, a currency board not only refrains from those 
components of monetary policy that imply discretionary elements, such as 
open market and lender of last resort operations, but also from any form of 
regulation or supervision of the financial sector. An orthodox currency board 
leaves financial institutions completely on their own, relying on the disciplining 
effect of the knowledge that there is no lender of last resort86. The currency 
board’s credibility is based on the commitment to a completely passive 
conduct, and on the limitation of its responsibility to the provision of a fully 
backed money base. 
However, the central role of foreign reserves makes a currency board 
country particularly vulnerable to external shocks. As it is deprived of active 
policy instruments to cope with such shocks, it is widely undisputed that a 
currency board should enact prudential regulations, which above all aim at 
structural and systemic characteristics of the banking system in order to make 
it as robust as possible and to reduce the need for situational support87. 
Reserve requirements and capital adequacy rules88 are among the most 
undisputed elements of financial sector regulation. Additional prudential 
regulations may concern interest rate and liquidity risks, aiming at mismatches 
in the maturity structure of banks’ assets and liabilities89. Of course, a strong 
                                     
86 See Eichengreen (2001), p. 269. 
87 For transparency, credibility, and organizational reasons, a division of the institution 
currency board is advisable: a currency department then solely undertakes the tasks of 
exchanging domestic against reserve currency and holding the reserves, whereas a 
banking department is responsible for the monetary policy issues. See Fuhrmann/Richert 
(1995), p. 1038. 
88 Capital adequacy ratios are recommended to be fixed well above the Basle standard 
of 8 percent, and probably even above the 12 percent discussed for banks in emerging 
markets, given the greater riskiness of banking in developing economies and the higher 
need for self-reliance in currency board countries. See Enoch/Gulde (1997), pp. 13-4. 
89 See Balino/Enoch (1997), p. 21. 
 Stabilization via Currency Board 40 
 
banking supervision, proper accounting standards, and stringent disclosure 
requirements are preconditions for the enforcement of such regulations90. 
That said, although conflicting with a currency board’s basic principle of 
limited discretion and even more clearly deviating from the “orthodox” 
currency board design, a certain capacity to deliver lender of last resort 
support might nevertheless be prudential in order to retain the ability to avert 
incipient banking crises, and to contain their possibly contagious effects, 
especially under conditions of uncertainty or large external shocks. Such 
lender of last resort capacity can, as long as it is funded by excess reserves 
set aside for this purpose, and follows specified rules, strengthen confidence 
in the domestic banking system and as a consequence lower intermediation 
spreads, without exposing the system too much to the imminent problems of 
reduced credibility and moral hazard91. 
4.4.1 Control of Private Money Creation 
A completely exogenous money supply and inflation rate would imply the 
absence of private sector money creation, as would be the case with a 
reserve requirement for commercial banks at 100%92. However, the 100% 
reserve requirement does not extend to commercial banks, and private money 
creation works under a currency board as in any two-tier banking system. 
Reserve to deposit ratios of commercial banks (the fraction of deposits held 
as reserves) as well as the currency-deposit ratio of the public (the fraction of 
deposits the public desires to hold in currency) are the determinants of the 
money multiplier, i.e. of the degree to which changes in the money base 
                                     
90 Banking supervision should ideally be transferred to an independent agency. Where 
the currency board itself undertakes banking supervision, it should credibly demonstrate 
that currency board rules will not be circumvented in case of banking sector difficulties. See 
Enoch/Gulde (1998), p. 7. 
91 See Balino/Enoch (1997), p. 20. 
92 See Fuhrmann (1999), p. 95. 
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(which, under a currency board, mirror foreign reserve changes) translate into 
money stock changes in the economy93. 
An orthodox currency board does not influence the money supply by 
imposing reserve ratios or by regulating commercial banks, but leaves its 
determination completely to market forces94. However, private money creation 
can be a source of instability: with a high money multiplier, capital inflows may 
translate into unacceptably high rises in domestic credit, capital outflows into 
sharp contractions of the money stock. Though the responsiveness of the 
money supply is a central principle in the currency board idea, a currency 
board may wish to dampen the expansionary as well as contractionary effects 
of foreign reserve movements by imposing minimum reserve requirements. 
Thus, on the macroeconomic level, reserve requirements can serve to control 
inflationary pressures, to reduce adaptation costs of the domestic economy, 
and so to enhance the currency board’s sustainability. On the microeconomic 
level, they can help strengthen the financial sector by ensuring it holds 
sufficient reserves to meet liquidity demands of its customers, and by 
establishing additional liquidity buffers that may be needed to smooth out 
interest rate volatility or limit the risk of settlement failures. For a typical 
central bank, minimum reserve requirements are also an important instrument 
of discretionary control of the money supply: rises and reductions in the 
reserve requirements serve as brakes or accelerators for money growth. 
While this latter function sharply contrasts with the concept of a currency 
board, the setting of minimum reserve requirements, with the aim to keep the 
money multiplier adequate and constant95, is largely regarded as a prudential 
issue even for a currency board. 
                                     
93 See Walters (1989), pp. 111-2. 
94 For a detailed description of money supply under a currency board see e.g. 
Hanke/Schuler (2000), pp. 26-39, Humpage/Owen (1995), pp. 3-5, or Zarazaga (1995a), 
pp. 1-2. 
95 A typical phenomenon during stabilization or transformation processes is the 
increase of non-cash payments and a reduction of the currency-deposit ratio of the public. 
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If, as pointed out above, a currency board accepts the need for a certain 
lender of last resort capacity, the interest earned on foreign reserves held by 
the currency board to back banks’ (unremunerated) reserves can be used to 
build up excess reserves earmarked for this purpose. Moreover, a currency 
board may wish some degree of discretion by keeping the option to adjust 
reserve ratios on an ad hoc basis in case of liquidity crises96. Again, the 
conditions of such adjustment should be transparent and well-defined ex ante 
in order to maximise the currency board’s credibility. 
However, the requirement for banks to hold high and unremunerated 
reserves with the currency board reduces their profitability, and so may put 
the banking sector’s soundness at risk. Liquidity requirements, while serving 
the same macro and microeconomic purposes, may offer an alternative, 
especially when there is a risk of systemic liquidity crises97. Allowed to hold 
the required fraction of liabilities as liquid reserves within the banking system, 
banks can earn interest on their reserves, which strengthens their profitability. 
Liquidity requirements can be fine-tuned in a way that some of the liquidity 
risk that otherwise would imply externalities can be internalised: higher 
liquidity requirements can be imposed on liabilities that have short maturities, 
are volatile, or are close substitutes for foreign assets. A further advantage 
over reserve requirements is that banks can be allowed to deposit their 
liquidity reserves abroad. Thus, they can be given broad responsibility for the 
management and use of their liquidity reserves, which is likely to contain 
moral hazard more than with reserve requirements, and therefore may limit 
the need for discretionary central bank intervention98. 
                                                                                                                           
Higher reserve requirements for banks can prevent increases in the money multiplier with 
the potentially destabilising effects. See Fuhrmann/Richert (1995), p. 1038. 
96 See Balino/Enoch (1997), p. 20. 
97 See Balino/Enoch (1997), p. 23. 
98 In addition, systemic stability can be enhanced via the imposition of an autonomous 
deposit insurance fund with limited coverage, funded by the banks themselves. Moral 
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4.4.2 Clearing and Day-to-Day Monetary Operations 
As pointed out, the design of a pure currency board does not include any 
engagement in operations with the financial sector other than the exchange of 
foreign reserves against domestic currency. As this implies a complete loss of 
control over interest rates, a country with an orthodox currency board has to 
rely on a functioning financial sector, that is able to provide for a proper and 
timely allocation of liquidity and a smooth adaptation to interest movements. 
In the absence of a strong and sophisticated financial sector, it may again be 
justifiable to deviate from the orthodox principle in the design of payment 
systems and monetary arrangements in a way that allows coping with the 
limitations imposed by the currency board while sticking to its commitment to 
refrain from discretionary action99. 
For example, allowing banks to hold their settlement accounts with the 
monetary authority and granting their unconditional convertibility at the official 
exchange rate facilitates a smooth handling of liquidity fluctuations. To 
facilitate the provision of fully backed liquidity for commercial banks, the 
currency board may use foreign exchange swaps, which facilitate short-term 
capital flows and promote interest rate arbitrage100. 
More conflicting with an orthodox currency board design are provisions of 
standing liquidity facilities (for instance a Lombard window) or conventional 
open market operations. While they can be used to facilitate settlements, 
meet daily changing liquidity requirements and promote the adaptation of 
domestic interest rates to changes in foreign interest rates, the implied room 
for discretion potentially can undermine a currency board’s credibility. It is 
                                                                                                                           
hazard can be limited by making insurance premiums dependant on the riskiness of each 
bank’s portfolio. See Hanke/Schuler (2000), p. 66. 
99 See Bennett (1994), p. 199-200. 
100 While this intention does basically not contradict a pure currency board’s objective, 
there is some risk that swaps may be used to postpone necessary policy actions, hence 
that they offer some discretionary leeway, and that they would be costly should the 
exchange rate peg have to be changed. See Balino/Enoch (1997), p. 20. 
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important that such facilities are not used to gain control over the level of 
interest rates, since this would interfere with the mechanism through which 
banks equilibrate the distribution of monetary assets and liabilities. 
Accordingly, such operations have to be limited in scope and clearly defined. 
4.4.3 Lender of Last Resort Function 
As already pointed out, a pure currency board does not include any room 
for lender of last resort operations. In signalling that the maintenance of the 
fixed exchange rate is the overriding goal, the abstinence from intervention is 
an important determinant of the credibility of a currency board. It is thought to 
promote the soundness of the banking system by enforcing market discipline, 
limiting moral hazard and inducing banks to limit their risk exposure. 
It is, however, impossible to obtain a complete reduction of banks’ risk to 
failure. This is especially true where the banking system is (still) weak or 
where it is exposed to adverse external shocks. The risk is that a financial 
crisis undermines the currency board’s political backbone and finally leads to 
its collapse. Most currency boards, therefore, hold a limited “safety margin” of 
excess reserves, kept aside for interventions in accordance with the currency 
board rules in order to gain some flexibility101. 
Unlike with other features of a currency board, the trade-off between 
credibility and flexibility does not seem so obvious for the lender of last resort 
issue. As long as sufficient reserves are available, some flexibility can, on the 
one hand, strengthen confidence in the domestic banking sector, add 
credibility to the currency board, and enhance its sustainability. On the other 
hand, it may limit its transparency, which might work against its credibility 
                                     
101 Given a sound financial sector, the foreign exchange set aside for lender of last 
resort support can also originate from a common pool of commercial bank funds. Other 
possibilities to ensure the availability of funds in case of need are mutual support 
agreements with monetary authorities of other countries, or lines of credit with foreign 
banks, guaranteed by the currency board on behalf of domestic banks. See Balino/Enoch 
(1997), p. 23. 
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again. It might signal investors that the stability of the domestic banking 
system is deemed a goal superior to the maintenance of the exchange rate, 
which might evoke capital flight102. The exposure to moral hazard, a problem 
inherent in any constellation where economic agents can expect to be bailed-
out in case of liquidity problems, is a further danger. It cannot be completely 
excluded103, as even under a credible currency board it can be rationally 
expected that in the case of a systemic crisis authorities will eventually rescue 
banks in order to limit the damage and to prevent a collapse of the currency 
board. 
These challenges for a currency board’s sustainability can be limited to 
the degree that the excess reserves held for this purpose are strictly confined 
and rules for their use are transparent and clearly defined. Besides the 
general need for proper prudential regulations and supervisory arrangements 
designed to reduce the need of lender of last resort operations in the first 
place, even these operations should rather address systemic problems in the 
banking system than bail-out single insolvent banks104. 
Another possibility is to transfer the lender of last resort function to the 
government, or even leave it to world capital markets105. Again, as with the 
currency board itself engaging in limited lender of last resort activities, the 
government will be able to deliver such support only to the extent that it 
disposes of foreign reserves, ideally accumulated over time through profit 
transfers from the currency board, or granted from external creditors. The 
advantage of such a constellation may be that the strict separation of the 
lender of last resort function from the currency board may increase the 
credibility of the arrangement106. 
                                     
102 See Eichengreen (1996), p. 239. 
103 See Dolmas/Zarazaga (1996), p. 2. 
104 See Bennett (1994), p. 201. 
105 See Dornbusch (2001), p. 239. 
106 See Humpage/McIntire (1995), pp. 8-9, and Hanke/Schuler (2000), p. 65. 
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A further and potentially very important factor limiting the need of lender of 
last resort operations is a high proportion of branches of foreign-owned banks 
within the domestic banking sector107. Branches of foreign banks generally 
face an elastic supply of reserve currency from their parent. Moreover, 
branching generally encourages diversification within the banking sector and 
the development of interbank lending markets. Thus, an open and minimally 
regulated banking sector reduces the likelihood of banking crises and the 
need for lender of last resort assistance108. 
4.5 Conduct of Fiscal Policy 
As pointed out, a pure currency board issues money solely on the base of 
foreign reserves, and does not hold domestic assets. This means that any 
form of government financing through the monetary authority is precluded. As 
any fixed exchange rate regime, a currency board has to rely on the support 
of fiscal policy. Given the main motivation of a currency board to stop inflation, 
beforehand typically created through extensive central bank financing of the 
government, this restriction represents a cut that is elementary for the 
establishment of a currency board’s credibility109. 
Before the adoption of a currency board, governments typically faced soft 
budget constraints, i.e. were able to obtain funding through fresh money 
printed by de facto dependant central banks. Now they have to do without the 
previously earned inflation tax to finance fiscal deficits and instead have to 
rely on “open” sources of tax income110. This means that they are forced to 
consolidate budgets via tax increases and/or spending cuts, or to attract funds 
                                     
107 A currency board, by largely eliminating exchange rate risk, is supposed to 
generally encourage branch banking, especially with large, global banks headquartered in 
the reserve country. 
108 See Humpage/McIntire (1995), p. 8. 
109 See Enoch/Gulde (1998), p. 6. 
110 See Roubini (1998), p. 14. 
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from domestic or international borrowers111. When relying on domestic 
sources of finance, e.g. loans from commercial banks, governments have to 
keep their borrowing requirements sufficiently low so as not to crowd out 
banks’ lending to the private sector. Thus, a credible currency board makes 
governments (supposed they regard the costs of default as prohibitive) face 
the need to keep public borrowing requirements at or near zero, i.e. it imposes 
hard budget constraints112. 
If, as in most countries, fiscal policy is not concentrated upon a single 
centralized authority, then municipal, state or provincial, and central fiscal 
authorities have to agree on a common consolidation policy, which risks to be 
exposed to political dispute. Currency boards therefore might work better in 
countries where the fisc is centralized, or at least effective co-ordination 
mechanisms among the different fiscal levels are in place113. 
Again, modern currency boards sometimes make modest compromises 
with respect to the budget constraint, and allow a certain proportion of backing 
assets to be held in government debt denominated in the reserve currency. 
Although the credibility of the fixed exchange rate depends on the assets 
used to back it being external, limited and sufficiently small proportions of 
government debt, denominated in terms of the reserve currency, may stay 
without harm to the currency board’s credibility114. 
Another problem to solve is how both day-to-day liquidity management 
and longer-term management of government debt, typically previously done 
by the monetary authority115, should be organized under a currency board. It 
                                     
111 However, a credible currency board is able to compensate for the loss of inflation 
tax by lower interest rates and reduced debt service costs. See Dornbusch (2001), p. 239. 
112 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), p. 13. 
113 See Eichengreen (2001), p. 272. 
114 See Bennett (1994), p. 198. 
115 Typical central banks hold and manage government deposits and provide overdraft 
provisions. However, movements in government deposits are associated with reserve 
changes that compromise the currency board. 
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seems clear that the purest and most transparent solution is not to allow the 
currency board to hold government deposits, but to pass government 
accounts as well as their management to commercial banks. If a currency 
board chooses to keep government deposits, possibly because the domestic 
banking sector is not (yet) able to undertake the related tasks, it should do so 
only under the conditions that government deposits are fully backed by foreign 
reserve holdings, that there are no overdraft provisions, and that interest is 
paid only if covered by the currency board’s own interest income on reserve 
assets116. 
The question of how to handle stocks of outstanding government debt is 
closely related. The most conform solution for a currency board would be to 
balance public budgets before its introduction, or to sell government debt to 
the market and stop buying new debt117. Open market operations related to 
government debt, such as the issuance and marketing of treasury bills, should 
be passed to the fiscal authorities118. It is then their responsibility to balance 
the maturity structure of government securities, and to keep the securities 
markets sufficiently liquid, a task that is all the more important when 
government securities are an important fraction of the banking system. 
With exchange rate and monetary policy severely restricted under a 
currency board, the conduct of fiscal policy is crucial for the success and 
sustainability of a currency board. Fiscal policy in this context may take over 
some of the tasks normally ascribed to monetary and/or exchange rate 
management, as, for instance, the dampening of business cycles (though 
boosting cycles has to be subject to budgetary limits). During incipient debt 
                                     
116 See Enoch/Gulde (1997), pp. 14-6. 
117 Where the currency board itself is divided into a banking and a currency 
department, the government debt can also be booked to the banking department in order 
to let the currency department operate as a pure currency board. 
118 Where organizational problems (e.g. staff qualification) exist, the currency board 
can also take over these functions passively, i.e. on a strict “fee for service” basis for the 
government. 
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crises, fiscal policy can help restore confidence by reducing structural deficits. 
Fiscal surpluses can reduce the country’s dependence on foreign savings and 
build up its international reserves position119. 
4.6 Institutional Preconditions 
The core of a currency board’s credibility, as opposed to the credibility of a 
purely fixed exchange rate, is the legal and institutional anchoring of the 
arrangement, meant to erect high obstacles to any change. A maximum 
degree of credibility is obtained by including the currency board into the 
country’s constitution, or by requiring a parliamentary supermajority to reverse 
the arrangement. On this basis, a currency board law (sometimes named 
central bank law) defines the new monetary regime. This law can be very 
simple and short120. It has to define the exchange rate and the reserves, the 
structure as well as the activities (and their limitation) of the monetary 
authority. Especially, it has to settle the currency board’s relation to the 
government121. Finally, it has to rule that a well-defined set of statistics is to be 
published regularly, in order to establish a maximum of transparency. 
The legal fixing of the exchange rate with the self-commitment of the 
monetary authority to sell foreign exchange at the defined rate is an important, 
but not sufficient precondition for the credibility and sustainability of a currency 
board: laws and even constitutions can always be changed when the political 
impetus exists. Nevertheless, the design of the legal setting can play an 
integral role in determining the degree of credibility. Especially, credible rules 
                                     
119 See Balino/Enoch (1997), p. 18. 
120 Hanke and Schuler recommend a very detailed and rigid currency board design and 
give a corresponding model for a currency board law. See Hanke/Schuler (2000), pp. 58-
64 and 73-6. 
121 E.g., to demonstrate the currency board’s sterility against government influence, it 
can be incorporated and required to hold its reserves abroad (e.g. in the reserve country or 
another “save haven” country), or be required to include a majority of foreign board 
members. 
 Stabilization via Currency Board 50 
 
defining the behaviour in situations of distress or of adverse external 
developments can add substantially to the credibility of a currency board122. 
Despite its simplicity, the setting up and enacting of the legal framework 
requires time and comprehensive information of the political decision makers, 
and, to be credible, broad and unequivocal support of a large political 
majority123.  
One of the biggest obstacles towards making a currency board credible is 
doubt about the soundness of the banking system. Therefore, along with the 
reduction of monetary policy functions of the currency board, especially its 
lender of last resort function, commercial banks have to be prepared for the 
new regime in order to make them as sound as possible, and to enable them 
for interbank markets that now have to function without permanent central 
bank intervention. As pointed out above, comprehensive prudential 
regulations as well as banking and stock market supervision, accounting 
standards, disclosure requirements, bankruptcy laws, and the payments 
system belong to the most important issues to be revised and strengthened. 
Where there is no realistic prospect for banks to comply with the new 
standards, the supervisory authority should be prepared to close them down. 
Privatising state-owned banks and allowing foreign banks to open branches in 
the country increases competition and efficiency, and reduces the need for 
lender of last resort activity, since branches of foreign parents generally will 
be granted liquidity assistance from abroad124. 
Further institutional conditions, though not directly related with the 
establishment of the new monetary constitution, arise from the 
interdependencies between the monetary and the real sectors of the 
                                     
122 E.g., Hanke and Schuler propose a rule according to which prolonged periods of 
strong deflation or inflation in the reserve country, both in degree and duration exceeding 
clearly defined ranges, force the currency board to either revalue or choose a new reserve 
currency. See Hanke/Schuler (2000), pp. 63-4. 
123 See Enoch/Gulde (1997), pp. 7-9. 
124 See Enoch/Gulde (1997), pp. 12-3. 
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economy, and typically require broad structural reforms. Most important, with 
a fixed exchange rate, the adaptation to real shocks has to occur via changes 
in prices and wages rather than via changes in the exchange rate125. 
Sustainability of a currency board therefore requires deregulated goods and 
labour markets that are flexible enough to absorb the effects of, say, an 
outflow of reserves that causes the money stock to decrease, interest rates to 
rise, and output and employment to shrink, through price and wage 
decreases, in order to re-establish internal and external balance126. 
Besides a broad deregulation of prices and wages, trade liberalization is 
necessary to strengthen market forces and optimise factor allocation. Since 
state-owned enterprises can no longer rely on the soft budget constraints they 
previously enjoyed, their privatisation not only brings about their market-
oriented realignment, but also contributes to restore government budgets127. 
The promotion of capital and know-how imports is a prerequisite for the 
development of key industries in developing or transforming economies. 
Generally, the rigid external anchor imposed by a currency board 
necessitates a streamlining of the real sector towards an internationally 
competitive and export-oriented economy, hence an economic alignment that 
requires a broad social consensus128. 
                                     
125 See e.g. Broda (2001), p. 377, who examines the empirical evidence for the 
potential of the exchange rate regime to buffer real shocks. 
126 See Gulde/Kähkönen/Keller (2000), pp. 5-6. 
127 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), p. 13. 
128 See Fuhrmann/Richert (1995), pp. 1038-9. 
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5 Strengths and Weaknesses of a Currency Board 
5.1 Strengths of a Currency Board 
5.1.1 Simplicity and Transparency 
One major advantage over a central bank is a currency board’s simplicity 
and transparency. As the currency board’s conduct is reduced by a simple 
rule to quasi-mechanical behaviour, its function and motivation are easy to 
understand even for the broad public. Given an adequate information policy, 
its behaviour is completely verifiable and predictable. The straightness of the 
arrangement is directly tangible for the whole population, especially when the 
reserve currency already is in broad use as a parallel currency before the 
currency board’s introduction, since foreign exchange transactions are 
simplified and freed from restrictions that typically prevailed before. In 
addition, the currency board’s simplicity is underlined by the reduced need for 
staff and bookkeeping within the currency board. 
Even where a currency board deviates from an orthodox design, and 
engages in certain regulatory, open market, or lender of last resort activities 
(as described above), its operations are clearly defined and limited in scope, 
thus easy to monitor129. This eliminates uncertainty and creates a calculable 
monetary framework for economic activity. 
5.1.2 Credibility 
A currency board’s main objective is the installation of credible disinflation 
policies. The credibility of stabilization policies decides over their success and 
sustainability. 
With inflation being to a great part the result of economic agents’ inflation 
expectations, typically shaped by past experiences of lax fiscal policy, 
accommodative monetary policy, and failed stabilization attempts, the 
                                     
129 See Balino/Enoch (1997), p. 6. 
 Stabilization via Currency Board 53 
 
adoption of a currency board, by almost instantaneously eliminating the scope 
for inflationary policies, can quickly restore policy credibility and provide clear 
signals for the revision of expectations. The main determinant of this kind of 
credibility is the severe self-restriction of the government and the 
preparedness to surrender flexibility for the sake of credibility130. 
For countries lacking a well-established track record of price stability, less 
strict ways towards building up credibility, e.g. through the self-commitment of 
an autonomous central bank, are very time-consuming and often doomed to 
fall victim to speculative attacks131. 
5.1.3 Currency Stability 
Short to official dollarization, a currency board establishes the closest link 
of the domestic currency to an external anchor. It introduces a high degree of 
substitutability between anchor and domestic currency, or, put differently, it 
imports the reserve currency’s stability. 
The convergence of domestic towards reserve country inflation rates is the 
result of the built-in automatic monetary adjustment mechanism of a currency 
board: a higher price level in the currency board country leads to a balance of 
payments deficit, reserve outflows and a shrinking monetary base, which 
causes a rise in interest rates that exerts a correcting deflationary pressure, 
which again improves the balance of payments132. Inflation differentials 
between anchor and domestic currency widely disappear, or, where they 
persist to limited degrees, reflect real rather than purely monetary 
developments (e.g. higher growth rates in the currency board than in the 
reserve currency country). 
                                     
130 See Eichengreen (1996), p. 239. 
131 The experience of the Mexican peso crisis in 1995 is an example how coherent 
policy measures, though initially able to produce good results, were not enough to 
constitute a lasting credible monetary policy reputation. See Humpage/Owen (1995), p. 2. 
132 This is the famous price-specie-flow-mechanism first described by David Hume. 
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In the same way, nominal wage growth approaches the respective wage 
growth rates in the reserve country, plus an allowance for productivity gains. 
Real wages in a currency board country therefore can increase quickly when 
productivity increases133. 
5.1.4 Interest Rate Convergence 
Along with currency stabilization, one of the main benefits of a currency 
board is that it promotes the convergence of domestic interest rates to reserve 
currency levels134. This is, like the convergence of inflation rates, a direct 
consequence of the automatic monetary adjustment mechanism, according to 
which a supposed flight into the reserve currency will cause the domestic 
monetary base to shrink and domestic interest rates to rise until a level is 
reached where holding local currency becomes again attractive. Remaining 
risk premia demanded for holding domestic currency reflect the state of 
confidence in the stability of the domestic currency’s purchasing power. They 
are supposed to decrease with successful stabilization135. 
Risk premia are composed of country and currency risk. Currency risk can 
be described as the probability of exchange rate realignment. It can be 
measured as the differential between interest rates granted in the currency 
board country for domestic as opposed to reserve currency deposits. Country 
risk, in contrast, reflects the political, legal, and/or economic risks prevailing in 
a country. It can be assessed comparing the interest rates of reserve currency 
deposits (or, as well, reserve currency money market rates) in the currency 
board country with those in the reserve country136. Currency and country risk 
cannot be completely separated: the higher the currency risk (i.e. the risk that 
the exchange rate is changed), the higher the perceived country risk, as 
economic and political conditions of the currency board country would be 
                                     
133 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), p. 38. 
134 See Dornbusch (2001), p. 240. 
135 See Fuhrmann (1999), p. 92. 
136 See Balino/Enoch (1997), pp. 32-4. 
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severely affected by a change in the exchange rate. Similarly, a higher 
country risk (e.g. because of rising banking sector problems, or following 
external shocks) will immediately spill over to a higher currency risk by adding 
pressure to the currency. Therefore, for instance, as long as there is an 
institutional possibility that the currency board could be changed, or that 
banks may get illiquid (both of which cannot be completely excluded), a 
certain risk premium will always remain, even if a currency board is doing 
well137. 
Bank rates, particularly long-term lending rates, in the currency board 
country often remain significantly above respective rates in the reserve 
currency country. This is to be explained mainly with higher domestic credit 
risk, different lending policies, lacks in transparency, and possibly unsound 
banks. Over time however, in the course of stabilization and institutional 
reforms, risk premia should decline substantially. 
Besides the beneficiary effects of lower interest rates on domestic 
investment and public households, interest rates converging to international 
levels due to reduced exchange rate uncertainty and the perception of orderly 
monetary conditions help promote international trade and access to 
international capital markets, and so facilitate international integration that is a 
prerequisite for a currency board country’s growth. 
Compared to conventional fixed pegs, these benefits seem to be clearer, 
because the adoption of a currency board implies that the government is 
generally more adept to strengthen policies overall, which results not only in 
lower interest rates demanded by investors but also in smaller interest rate 
changes (and concomitant costs for the economy) necessary to adjust to 
changes in monetary conditions138 
                                     
137 See Bennett (1994), p. 206. 
138 See Balino/Enoch (1997), p. 9. 
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5.1.5 Financial Intermediation 
The credibility of a currency board is supposed to strengthen the financial 
sector and stimulate financial intermediation and remonetization of the 
economy, measurable in increasing ratios of broad money to GDP, growth 
rates of credit to the private sector, and ratios of deposits to broad money. 
This is the mainly result of three effects, the first resulting from the 
abstinence of the monetary authority to provide a financial safety net and from 
the concomitant reduction of moral hazard for banks that cannot any longer 
rely on being bailed out by the authorities via devaluation of the domestic 
currency. This works to induce them to more responsible risk taking in 
liquidity, currency, and maturity terms. The absence of a central liquidity 
provider also stimulates and intensifies interbank lending139. 
Second, a credible currency board leads to a lengthening of agents’ 
horizons140, and hence to a return of domestic and international long-term 
lending to domestic banks and firms, which previously had been discouraged 
by the prevailing currency risk. Financial and real sectors get more liquid, and 
currency risks resulting from domestic currency assets and foreign currency 
liabilities in banks’ and firms’ balances are covered by the exchange rate 
commitment. Similarly, maturity mismatches arising from long-term 
investments that under the previous conditions of distrust and exchange rate 
uncertainty had to be forcibly financed by short-term loans, are reduced when 
currency risk is eliminated141. 
Finally, ameliorating economic and financial conditions work to attract 
international banks to open up business in the currency board country, 
leading to enhanced competition, a more efficient financial sector and real 
credit growth. In short, a currency board, by eliminating exchange rate 
                                     
139 See the respective comments in the section “Constitutional Elements”. The 
question of whether a strong financial sector is an effect or a precondition of a credible 
currency board will be addressed below. 
140 See Dornbusch (2001), p. 240. 
141 See Eichengreen (2001), p. 269-71. 
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uncertainty, is expected to encourage the development of a sophisticated 
financial sector that serves the needs of a growing and diversifying local 
economy striving to intensify its integration into the world economy. 
5.2 Weaknesses of a Currency Board 
Not surprisingly, the weaknesses of a currency board are the flip side of its 
strengths. Most notably, the fixed parity can become an obstacle to 
adequately respond to large exchange rate misalignments. Similarly, the rigid 
backing rule makes the financial system vulnerable in case of crises. 
Operational simplicity in central banking rules out important and otherwise 
possibly beneficent central bank functions. Finally, by preventing the 
government from lending from the currency board, an immediate fiscal 
consolidation is required that may be difficult to realize. 
5.2.1 Nominal Exchange Rate Rigidity and Exchange Rate Misalignments 
One of the biggest threats arising for the sustainability of a currency board 
is the danger of a growing misalignment of the real exchange rate142. A post 
stabilization boom, as often experienced after successful stabilization, may 
lead to a positive growth rate differential between currency board and reserve 
currency country. As a consequence, price levels in the currency board 
country, although approaching reserve country levels, often remain well above 
reserve (or trading partner) country levels due to higher demand for goods 
and services, which leads to decreasing competitiveness143. Other factors 
contributing to inflation differentials over the reserve country level can be 
increased productivity due to the opening up of the economy144, or high capital 
                                     
142 See Roubini (1998), p. 5-8. 
143 Especially prices of nontraded goods, being in inelastic supply, often rise faster 
than in the reserve currency country. 
144 This is true for the so-called productivity bias that results from differential 
productivity growth within an open economy. With fixed nominal exchange rates, realized 
productivity gains in the tradable sector result in wage increases, which are transmitted to 
the nontradable sector. If productivity growth in the nontradable sector is less, this leads to 
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inflows due to the newly perceived macroeconomic stability of the country. 
Also, an initial undervaluation of the exchange rate, while partly chosen to 
provide room for inflation inertia, may by itself contribute to initial inflation145. 
An appreciation of the real exchange rate (defined as the quotient of nominal 
exchange rate and price level) is the result. 
While exchange rate misalignments are a problem for most exchange rate 
based stabilization programmes, they are a more serious concern for currency 
boards as the option of adjustment of the nominal exchange rate, i.e. 
devaluation, is barred. The correction of a misalignment therefore has to 
occur via the adjustment process over the balance of payments: a 
deterioration of the balance of payments (in the current and/or the capital 
account), a shrinking monetary base, and price and wage deflation146. Where 
prices and wages are sticky, the adjustment effectuates prolonged periods of 
tight liquidity and high unemployment, which again can challenge the 
sustainability of the currency board. 
Nominal exchange rate rigidity also makes a currency board country more 
vulnerable to external shocks or to an instable reserve currency. E.g., with 
incongruent business cycles prevailing in the two countries, changes in 
monetary conditions in the reserve currency country may lead to situations 
where interest rates of the reserve currency country are too high or too low for 
the current economic situation in the currency board country. The currency 
board then, in effect, has procyclical effects: imported interest rates that are 
too low for a booming currency board country can aggravate already 
prevailing inflationary pressures, too high interest rates intensify a monetary 
and real contraction147. When the value of the reserve currency changes in 
                                                                                                                           
increasing prices for nontradables and to inflation, which, if productivity growth in the 
reserve country is less, exceeds inflation in the reserve country. See Hanke/Schuler 
(2000), pp. 38-9. 
145 See Williamson (1995), p. 22. 
146 See Enoch/Gulde (1998), p. 2. 
147 See Williamson (1995), pp. 24-5. 
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relation to the currencies of other trading partners, similar costs are incurred: 
a weakening reserve currency then results in a depreciation of the currency 
board currency vis-à-vis its other trading partners and hence in an inflationary 
bias, and vice versa in the case of an appreciation of the reserve currency. As 
pointed out above, the design of a currency board, and especially the choice 
of the anchor currency, decide to a great extent over the exposedness to 
external shocks. 
5.2.2 Financial Fragility in the Absence of a Lender of Last Resort 
Compared to conventional fixed exchange rates, the financial system has 
the overall preconditions to be less fragile under a currency board: sufficient 
foreign reserves have to be maintained to ensure convertibility, and bank runs 
motivated by expectations of exchange rate realignments are discouraged. 
Although this reduces the probability of bank runs, their occurrence is still 
possible. If one occurs, a currency board is more vulnerable than a system 
with central banking, since it is largely deprived of instruments to deal with 
crises (namely of lender of last resort functions)148. Comparatively small 
disruptions in the financial sector can spread fast and even lead to a national 
financial panic when the knowledge about the absence of any lender of last 
resort assistance accelerates bank runs149. 
A currency board grants full convertibility for notes and coins, but not for 
deposits. Therefore, although banks may keep sufficient reserves to meet 
“normal” conversion demands, a bank run, (i.e. a sudden increase in the 
currency-deposit ratio of the public) may make them unable to honour 
requests for deposit withdrawals. Selling liquid domestic assets may help 
single banks, but do nothing to solve systemic crises, as it leaves the overall 
reserves base unchanged. While increasing interest rates offer a short-term 
                                      
148 See Roubini (1998), p. 2-3. 
149 See Zarazaga (1995b), pp. 17-8. 
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solution, over time they damage confidence in the sustainability of the 
currency board150. 
Improperly managed public debt is another source of instability. If large 
proportions of public debt are outstanding in the short term, this may lead to 
speculative attacks exposing the government to a debt crisis even if the levels 
of public indebtedness are sustainable. In turn, when government securities 
form an important part of banks’ liquidity, such a debt crisis may also trigger a 
banking crisis. 
As becomes evident, in the absence of a lender of last resort, a currency 
board’s fragility in case of financial crises increases with high capital mobility, 
a weak (or weakly supervised) banking sector, a dominance of local banks 
without access to foreign funds, and weaknesses in the structure of public 
debt. 
5.2.3 Loss of Other Central Bank Functions 
Besides being restricted in its function to deal with financial crises, a pure 
currency board also refrains from other central bank functions, such as day-
to-day monetary management and the settlement of payments. 
A currency board is designed to leave liquidity adjustment to capital flows 
and interest rate arbitrage within the financial sector. However, unless 
financial markets are highly developed, market imperfections, transaction 
costs, and credit risk account for high volatility and intermediation spreads, 
which penalize capital flows and hamper arbitrage. Consequently, though 
capital account transactions may be fully liberalized and interest rates may 
generally follow international movements, capital flows may be unable to fully 
arbitrage interest rates with sufficient speed. Ensuing short-term liquidity 
mismatches then negatively affect financial and exchange markets, subject 
the economy to unnecessary fluctuations, and possibly undermine the 
                                     
150 Empirically, persisting and high interest rate differentials to reserve currency levels, 
especially for long-term deposits and loans, generally reflect prevailing expectations of 
banking crises or a collapse of the currency board. See Balino/Enoch (1997), p. 15. 
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currency board’s credibility. This is why most modern currency boards do 
engage in day-to-day monetary operations to smooth out adjustment to short-
term liquidity imbalances. 
Similarly, under a pure currency board, clearing and settlement services 
are provided by the private sector. Then, settlement failures are possible, 
especially when the currency board provides no lender of last resort 
assistance. Again, deviating from the orthodox design and allowing banks to 
settle in the books of the currency board reduces this risk151. 
5.2.4 Constraints on Fiscal Policy 
Currency boards promote, but cannot guarantee fiscal discipline152. With 
central bank financing precluded, fiscal deficits can still be (typically to a much 
larger part than before) financed via debt issue on domestic and international 
capital markets, or through payment arrears. While all fixed exchange rate 
arrangements require sound public finances, a currency board is especially 
vulnerable in the case of fiscal indiscipline153. 
Under a currency board, substantial fiscal deficits, if financed by foreign 
capital, exert an inflationary pressure on the economy, as the inflow of 
reserves increases the monetary base. Even if financed domestically, by 
crowding out private financing needs and driving them towards international 
markets, fiscal deficits have an inflationary impact and lead to an appreciation 
of the real exchange rate. They can thus compromise the currency board’s 
sustainability, and even lead to its abandonment in case of a debt crisis. As a 
currency board does not engage in accommodating treasury bill markets, 
short-term fluctuations in treasury cash flows may occur and create additional 
stress for public finances154. 
                                     
151 See Balino/Enoch (1997), p. 17. 
152 See Roubini (1998), p. 15. 
153 See Williamson (1995), p. 16. 
154 See Balino/Enoch (1997), p. 18. 
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In the worst case, where governments cease to accept their financial 
subordination to the monetary regime, there is a possibility that they might 
“raid” the currency board in one form or another, e.g. by demonetising the 
currency board currency and issuing an own parallel currency. Therefore, 
although a currency board is able to reinforce an existing political commitment 
to fiscal discipline, it is jeopardized when such commitment is fading155. 
                                     
155 See Williamson (1995), pp. 28-9. 
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6 Considerations for Adopting a Currency Board 
6.1 When is a Currency Board an Appropriate Choice? 
As Fuhrmann (1999) notes, there is no theory that would predict under 
which circumstances and preconditions the introduction of a currency board is 
an optimal strategy156. In this context, most economists refer to a number of 
criteria that stem from the theory of optimal currency areas, supplemented by 
some arguments that take account of the special application of a currency 
board as a stabilization vehicle. 
(1) Only small and open economies benefit from an external nominal 
anchor. For an open economy (i.e. one with a high proportion of imports and 
exports to GDP), exchange rate uncertainty induces greater costs than for a 
closed economy, and fixing the exchange rate will to a greater extent imply a 
fixing of the price level. Since small economies tend to be more open, both 
criteria are intertwined157. Therefore, the argument holds, for small economies 
with the typical low degree of diversification, the best strategy is to choose 
fixed exchange rates in order to adapt to international price structures and 
maximise the advantages that arise from the international division of labour158. 
Consequently, the argument holds, only small economies should adopt a 
currency board. (2) When shocks tend to hit the pegging and the pegged-to 
country symmetrically, the real costs caused by the adjustment process with 
fixed exchange rates are minimised for the pegging country, whereas a higher 
probability for asymmetrical shocks would rather be an argument for flexible 
                                     
156 See Fuhrmann (1999), p. 86. 
157 Note that the criterion of country size is to be understood in economic, not 
geographical terms. E.g., Hong Kong, though geographically tiny, has to be regarded as a 
large “country” whereas Argentina, though geographically big, is a comparatively small 
economy in terms of GDP. 
158 See Fuhrmann/Richert (1995), p. 1036. 
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exchange rates159. (3) High factor, especially labour, mobility between 
pegging and pegged-to country is desirable for a country with fixed exchange 
rates as it facilitates the adjustment process and contributes to price level 
equilibration160. (4) If there are aspirations of a country to integrate into a 
common trade area (or to prepare to join a currency area), a currency board 
with its highly credible fixed exchange rate may ease such integration more 
than strategies with central banks and simply pegged exchange rates. (5) 
Lacking central banking experience of a country delivers a further argument 
for a currency board because of its simplicity of operation as well as the high 
degree of credibility of its strictly rule-bound activities. (6) Finally, for a country 
with a record of credibility-lacking monetary policy, of high and persistent 
inflation, of currency crises, and of high risk premiums required by 
international investors, a currency board with its high credibility and almost 
instant anti-inflationary impetus can provide an effective cure161. 
An additional criterion in this context may be the existence of a “natural” 
anchor currency, i.e. of a major reserve currency that fulfils the requirements 
of a suitable anchor162. At the margin, the lack of such a natural candidate to 
peg to may provide the decisive argument against a currency board163. 
The consideration of the suitability of a currency board for a country 
extends to an evaluation of the expected advantages and disadvantages of a 
currency board for the specific case. Some shortcomings in the starting 
position of a currency board country can certainly be addressed by 
precautionary measures, e.g. by allowing for a limited lender of last resort 
                                     
159 An additional consideration in this context refers to the assumption that a currency 
board (or a common currency) increases economic integration between the countries and 
so works to synchronize shocks and cycles, thereby increasing its advantageousness. See 
Alesina/Barro (2001), p. 383. 
160 See Williamson (1995), p. 23. 
161 See Balino/Enoch (1997), p. 6. 
162 See the above discussion about the choice of anchor currency. 
163 See Williamson (1995), p. 24. 
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capacity, or by promoting the entrance of foreign banks into the financial 
sector in order to partly compensate for a still weak banking sector. Other 
risks are potentially harder to address such as the dangers related with 
substantial and lasting real appreciation that may translate into long-term risks 
difficult to assess in terms of growth, income, and employment. 
Therefore, even if a country clearly appeared to be a candidate for a 
currency board, it should have become clear that adopting one would be far 
from automatically providing stability. The advantages of a currency board 
materialize only when supported by the described sustainable structural and 
macroeconomic, especially fiscal policies. Indeed, adversaries of the currency 
board idea argue that stability can be achieved by the very disciplined policies 
without the need to establish a currency board in most countries, given a 
sufficient time horizon164. 
However, and this is an argument that even currency board opponents 
concede, a currency board can deliver stability quickly, and in this respect is 
superior to a central bank that has to build up its own credibility over long 
periods. Put differently, for transformation economies without any track record 
of credibility, and for confidence-lacking high-inflation economies, a currency 
board’s present value is higher than a central bank’s, with a central bank 
solution facing higher “sunk costs” and barriers to entry than a currency 
board165. All the more for a hyperinflation country that is already looking back 
on several failed stabilization attempts (such as Argentina was in the late 
1980s): here the complete erosion of credibility can arguably provide an all or 
nothing situation where the adoption of a currency board seems to be the only 
chance to break the ever-accelerating cycle of inflation and depreciation166. 
In such a case, with the ills to cure so large, the potential remedy may 
justify very high costs even if the country is not in every respect an optimal 
                                     
164 See e.g. Roubini (1998), p. 16. 
165 See Fuhrmann/Richert (1995), p. 1038. 
166 See e.g. Williamson (1995) p. 34, or Zarazaga (1995b), p. 22. 
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candidate for a currency board. The challenge for such a country then will be 
to reap the currency board’s short-term benefits without putting at risk the 
country’s long-term position by not taking account of the currency board’s 
potential dangers. Explicitly trying to re-direct trade flows in order to improve 
the anchor’s long-term suitability, or else planning a timely exit after 
successful stabilization may belong to some possible alternatives to 
counteract these risks. 
6.2 Implementation of a Currency Board 
Although it is undisputable that the success of a currency board depends 
on strong supporting policies, the extent to which they are taken to be 
indispensable at the time of a currency board’s introduction is subject to 
discussion. The statement that strong macroeconomic policies, a strong 
banking system, and flexible labour and goods markets are prerequisites for a 
sustainable currency board is in this form unquestionable. On the other hand, 
it is just these qualities a country aspires to obtain via the adoption of a 
currency board. There is some general evidence that a hard peg by itself is 
able to boost financial sector, fiscal and labour market reform167. Therefore, 
earmarking these reforms as being indispensable preconditions to be fulfilled 
by a country that is only beginning to solve its severe problems of 
transformation or hyperinflation seems at least problematic. 
A certain qualification can be made according to the notion that among the 
prerequisites for a sustainable currency board, some are clearly indispensable 
for the start, whereas others that primarily aim at protection against potential 
shocks can be left for implementation (or improvement) when the currency 
board is already in place. The first, indispensable, category doubtlessly 
comprises a sufficient level of reserves to grant the conversion commitment, a 
sound fiscal policy stance, and a satisfactorily robust banking system. In 
                                     
167 Eichengreen addresses this issue for the regime of official dollarization. He finds 
that the case for dollarization accelerating financial market and fiscal reform is strong, 
whereas its effect on labour market reform remains ambiguous. See Eichengreen (2001). 
 Stabilization via Currency Board 67 
 
contrast, efforts such as installing an efficient banking supervision or making 
labour laws more flexible can (but should rapidly) be made after the 
installation of the currency board168. 
Clearly, the risk is that with the experience of a possible initial stabilization 
boom following the currency board’s introduction, politically queasy reforms 
such as revising labour laws may be postponed or pushed through half-
heartedly. Neglecting these reforms can contribute to substantial exchange 
rate misalignments and to high real costs including rising unemployment, 
which again can put the currency board under social and political pressure. 
The necessary political and social consensus for these reforms is easiest to 
obtain at the start of the currency board, when the pains of the previous 
regime are still felt and the preparedness to agree on hurting measures is 
biggest. This at least should provide the decisive argument for carrying out all, 
and especially the politically tricky, reforms as quickly as possible. 
This leads us to the consideration of two principal alternatives for the 
implementation of a currency board. The first is to introduce the new monetary 
regime in a kind of shock therapy, with the “shock” most eminently manifested 
in a sudden fixing of the exchange rate without a previous period of floating 
against the reserve currency. As pointed about above, the main problem is to 
find evidence for the “appropriate” exchange rate in terms of market 
conformity. The exchange rate therefore can only reflect an estimate that, if 
far from the imminent market rate, may not be accepted by the markets and 
induce potentially harmful capital movements. If the introduction of a currency 
board goes in parallel with a currency reform, the exchange rate of the new 
currency board currency in relation to the old currency has to be set 
simultaneously, which implies similar problems169. 
                                     
168 See Balino/Enoch (1997), pp. 18-9. 
169 An overvaluation of the old currency in relation to the new one can create a 
monetary surplus that may challenge reserves and negatively influence distribution. A 
strategy of parallel currencies, with old and new currency floating against each other over a 
limited period, can moderate distribution conflicts. See Fuhrmann/Richert (1995), p. 1036. 
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The alternative to a shock therapy is a gradualist approach, which implies 
the announcement to introduce the currency board at a later date while 
allowing the currency to float freely against the reserve currency during the 
interim period. The advantage of this approach is that markets are expected 
to deliver an unequivocal notion of the appropriate exchange rate. For high 
inflation economies with a record of failed stabilization policies, however, the 
problem will be to furnish the announcement with a maximum degree of 
credibility, in order not to evoke expectations of just another policy 
announcement that later will be abused for surprise inflation by the 
government (the time inconsistency problem). An announcement lacking 
credibility (because not immediately translated into visible action) would doom 
the preparation of the currency board’s introduction and lead to capital flight 
and continuing devaluation of the domestic currency170. 
Further limitations to the gradualist approach arise from the problems of 
timing and sequencing of different reform elements. For instance, with the 
usually high proportion of administered prices in both transformation and high 
inflation economies, the revelation of the “appropriate” exchange rate is 
limited to the extent that sovereign price fixing is not eliminated prior to the 
floating period. Price structures then are not yet adapted to the new regime, 
and the market equilibrium exchange rate does not equal the level that also 
would incorporate system conformity. Similar issues apply for fiscal reforms 
that require higher taxes and hence lead to a higher price level. Both price 
liberalisation and fiscal consolidation should ideally be in place before the 
floating period in order to reap its advantages in terms of an appropriate 
exchange rate171. Both however require credibility, which may be challenged 
for a gradualist approach in high-inflation countries. 
Therefore, gradualist approaches may be a more viable choice for 
transformation than for high inflation economies. As already pointed out, the 
                                     
170 See Fuhrmann/Richert (1995), p. 1039. 
171 See Fuhrmann (1999), p. 89. 
 Stabilization via Currency Board 69 
 
central advantage of a currency board is to be seen in its immediate 
effectiveness, an advantage that for high inflation countries may only be 
realizable by opting for some sort of shock therapy172. 
                                     
172 See Fuhrmann (1999), p. 94. 
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7 Duration and Termination of a Currency Board 
Colonial currency boards functioned adequately over long periods. 
However, in terms of motivation, environment, and functioning conditions, 
they are not fully comparable to present-day currency boards. The long-term 
character of currency boards that survived from colonial times generally is not 
doubted even today. Currency boards introduced during the last two decades 
of the 20th century offer a mixed picture. Hong Kong’s currency board is 
generally viewed as a permanent, i.e. long-term, arrangement, as probably 
was also Argentina’s, whereas Estonia and Lithuania seem to provide 
examples of currency boards implicitly designed to govern a limited period of 
transition, in order to prepare their economies for an eventual membership in 
the European Monetary Union. 
This section tries to qualify under which conditions a currency board can 
be viewed as a transitional or a permanent arrangement, and addresses the 
related question of when and how to exit from a currency board. 
7.1 Currency Board: Permanent or Transitional Arrangement? 
Currency boards can be viewed and implemented as permanent 
arrangements when a currency board allows realizing trade and other benefits 
for a country that belongs to a common currency area. Likewise, when a 
country experiences a lasting phase of high inflation and real appreciation of 
its currency, and/or is systematically exposed to speculative attacks, a 
currency board can, and should, be designed and presented as a long-term 
arrangement. 
In contrast, a currency board can be perceived as a transitional 
arrangement when a country experiences a transformation process from one 
economic regime to another, e.g. from socialist to market economy. Similarly, 
when a country faces a political regime change intending to stop deficiencies 
such as hyperinflation, money press funding of fiscal deficits, political 
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promiscuity173, or when a country faces other major institutional changes (e.g. 
the installation of a newly independent monetary authority that is still lacking a 
record of credibility), a currency board can be taken as an interim 
arrangement. In such cases, a currency board is expected to promote 
credibility and stability until a switch to a different exchange rate regime or 
monetary regime becomes feasible174. 
Depending on the initial motivation for the installation of a currency board, 
therefore, the decision for and timing of an exit has to be chosen according to 
different criteria. If the currency board was introduced primarily as a 
transitional arrangement intended to give time and stability during the 
building-up of institutional conditions for a functioning central bank, or for the 
joining of a monetary union, then the degree to which those functions are 
brought into effect decides about the timing of an exit. The abandonment of 
the currency board then is a desired development. 
Currency boards introduced to gain monetary credibility are different from 
the above insofar as the time for an exit is determined by the degree of 
credibility assumed to prevail after the termination of the currency board. 
Strong policies over a prolonged period of time are required to build up 
credibility. This implies also to endure exchange rate misalignments, which in 
itself carries substantial risk for the sustainability of a currency board. 
Especially in cases where a currency is overvalued, the currency board is 
prone to speculative attacks as well as to internal political pressures, which, if 
turning extreme, can not only make the currency board appear unsustainable, 
but also makes it difficult to choose the best time for an eventually 
unavoidable exit. The optimal exit point then would have to be gauged 
according to the achieved building-up of credibility over time on the one hand, 
and to internal and external pressures on the other hand, and would have to 
be viewed as an optimisation and the result of a trade-off. 
                                     
173 See Williamson (1995), p. 34. 
174 See Balino/Enoch (1997), p. 24. 
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7.2 Exit Options 
Typically, in the initial phase after the successful installation of a currency 
board, the public usually perceives that it would be irrational for the authorities 
to abandon the arrangement early. Over time, however, the weaknesses 
owed to the inflexibility of the arrangement become more visible and hurting, 
possibly evoking doubts about the sustainability of the currency board175. 
If at the same time the justification of the currency board as a vehicle to 
promote credibility is losing weight because confidence in the government has 
grown and institutional conditions have improved, this may deliver an 
argument for a gradual relaxation of the rules (“growing-out of the currency 
board”) and an eventual exit from the currency board176. This would then be 
viewed as the natural and desired development of a transitional process 
during which credibility is built-up, institutions are installed, and financial 
markets are developed. If in addition external conditions are favourable, a 
country is able to abandon the currency board out of a position of strength, i.e. 
to realize a so-called soft exit177. 
If, in contrast, the weaknesses of the currency board are felt, while the 
currency board’s expected achievements do not materialise, possibly because 
                                     
175 As Zarazaga points out, maybe the biggest risk to a currency board’s sustainability 
can be circumscribed by the time inconsistency problem, inherent in all kinds of policy 
rules. Since currency boards, especially in the long run, are almost certainly subject to 
pressure some time (be it caused by external shocks or by internal developments, such as 
price and wage deflation, or rising unemployment), it becomes at some point attractive for 
policymakers to abandon the chosen policy rule, arguing that the present situation is 
different from the original and therefore justifies a deviation. The perceived time 
inconsistency of monetary policy rules, here of the currency board rule, reduces credibility 
and hence the effectiveness of the very policy rule. See Zarazaga (1995b). 
176 See Williamson (1995), p. 35. 
177 A textbook example for a gradual exit is Ireland, which in the 60s and 70s gradually 
relaxed the currency board rules that since 1927 had tied the Irish pound to the pound 
sterling. Another example for an exit out of a position of strength, though not gradual, is 
given by Singapore and Malaysia in 1973. See Balino/Enoch (1997), pp. 26-7. 
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institutional, structural, and fiscal reforms have been delayed or ineffective, 
and confidence in the government is declining, the risk that the currency 
board eventually has to be abandoned under stress is substantial. 
Unfavourable external developments, such as an appreciating reserve 
currency or a sharp decline in capital inflows, may add to the stress and force 
the country to opt for a hard exit178. 
The theoretical exit options from the fixed exchange rate comprise its 
replacement by a different (depreciated or appreciated) fixed exchange rate, 
by a fixed exchange rate pegged to a different anchor, or by a floating 
exchange rate. While the move to a float inevitably comprises a complete exit 
from the currency board and a change to some form of central banking, 
changes resulting in a modified fixed exchange rate regime can be compatible 
both with the introduction of a central banking system or with a continuation of 
the currency board under a modified rule (also treated as “exit” for this 
purpose). 
As will be argued, any possible termination or modification of a currency 
board should be based on rules defined ex ante, i.e. on escape clauses built-
in at the time of its implementation. Along this rather normative statement, the 
problems and functioning conditions of each available exit option shall be 
briefly addressed. 
7.2.1 Built-in Escape Clauses 
Considering possible exits from a currency board, the only means to avoid 
the perception of a breach of policy commitment seems to be the provision of 
ex ante built-in escape clauses. Although the discussion of rules versus 
discretion in monetary policy seems to reveal that contingent rules (i.e. rules 
with some flexibility) are superior to non-contingent rules179, this cannot 
                                     
178 All of Argentina’s three currency boards (1902-14, 1927-29, 1991-2002) had to be 
given up under stress, with external shocks triggering the exits of 1914 and 1929. See 
Balino/Enoch (1997), p. 26. 
179 See Zarazaga (1995b), p. 20. 
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unconditionally apply to currency boards since their essence is that they fully 
rely on rules to build up credibility (instead of on a reputation of credible 
behaviour)180. 
Escape clauses that offer room for genuine discretion of the currency 
board (i.e. that leave possible actions or possible escape cases vaguely or not 
defined) are doubtlessly harmful to its credibility and introduce the stability 
risks associated with simple fixed exchange rates181. Such escape clauses 
can at best be envisaged for very extreme (and clearly discernible) situations 
such as national emergency. 
Escape clauses, however, that clearly pre-define actions and the 
constellations under which they are allowed, are different from the above, in 
that they do not open discretionary leeway. Whether even such well-defined 
built-in escape clauses undermine a currency board’s credibility from the 
beginning, or, on the contrary, entail an increase in credibility in reducing 
uncertainty about a currency board’s behaviour remains disputed. 
The main argument against such escape clauses relates to the criteria 
that trigger pre-defined actions (e.g. inflation or exchange rate limits exceeded 
by the reserve currency). Such trigger points, when approached, bear the 
potential to cause capital flows that render the escape case more probable 
than would otherwise be the case182. Thus, opponents of escape clauses 
                                     
180 The case of the gold standard might illustrate this. Although the gold standard 
appears to have been a non-contingent rule, in reality it had implicit escape clauses: the 
temporary suspensions of convertibility of the pound Sterling into gold during wars and 
financial crises can be viewed as applications of an inherent escape clause. However, the 
use of such discretionary leeway did no harm to the Bank of England as it could rely on a 
high reputation. See Zarazaga (1995a), p. 3. 
181 See Fuhrmann (1999), p. 103. 
182 Consider, for instance, an escape clause that allows the currency board to devalue 
as soon as the reserve currency exceeds a pre-defined appreciation threshold against 
another major currency. Any appreciation bringing the reserve currency near the trigger 
point would render the escape case more likely, which from a certain point would lead 
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argue, the mere existence of (even well-defined) escape clauses can by itself 
trigger speculative capital flows and lead to a termination of the currency 
board, which possibly might have survived without escape clause183. 
Advocates of escape clauses retort that it is uncertainty that feeds 
speculation. If uncertainty is removed in the sense that the behaviour of the 
currency board is rule-bound not only within but also beyond pre-defined 
ranges (e.g. of reserve currency appreciation/depreciation or 
inflation/deflation), there is no room left for speculation. The development of 
the reserve currency is the only thing that remains uncertain, and speculative 
capital flows remain limited, as they do not attack the currency board’s 
commitment184. Apart from that, the effect of speculative capital flows on the 
development of the reserve currency (usually a major international reserve 
currency) will be small at best, so that self-fulfilling prophecies are unlikely to 
arise from any escape clause included in the currency board law of a usually 
small economy. 
Therefore, in order not to put achieved credibility at risk when the currency 
board faces extreme situations, and with a view to the credibility of potential 
future monetary regimes, it is certainly better to stick to well-defined rules, 
known in advance to the public, to govern an exit from the existing currency 
board rule, than to behave in improvised ways185. 
7.2.2 Depreciation 
For a currency under pressure through inflation and real appreciation with 
no alleviation to be expected in the medium term, an early exit from the 
                                                                                                                           
speculators to sell currency board currency and buy reserve currency, thereby increasing 
the likelihood of the escape case. 
183 See Balino/Enoch (1997), p. 28. 
184 See Hanke/Schuler (2000), p. 64. 
185 During the 1995 tequila crisis and thereafter, the different performance of Mexico 
(that returned to discretion) and Argentina (that stuck to the currency board law and 
confined crisis management to the pre-defined options) can be viewed as offering a 
backing for this finding. See Zarazaga (1995b), pp. 20-22. 
 Stabilization via Currency Board 76 
 
currency board may limit the degree of overvaluation and of the connected 
real losses. However, an exit followed by substantial depreciation is certain to 
undermine the credibility of policymakers unless it can be clearly justified by 
major external shocks. 
The main problem with depreciation is that, if anticipated or even 
announced, it induces capital flight, as the public tries to convert domestic 
assets into reserve currency and to transfer them abroad. The resulting 
domestic interest rate increases can cause banks to break down, and the 
perceived risk can by itself cause bank runs and exacerbate the situation. 
Alleviating, if politically questionable, measures can consist in temporarily 
suspending convertibility of deposits, or in a forced conversion of all deposits 
into the reserve currency at the pre-depreciation exchange rate. These 
measures however are likely to further damage policymakers’ credibility. 
A pre-announced downward crawling peg may provide a possible solution. 
It may limit the credibility loss caused by breaking the exchange rate rule, 
although it does not provide an insurance against losing control of the 
situation in terms of a devaluation-inflation-spiral186. 
7.2.3 Appreciation 
An exit followed by a substantial appreciation does not carry penalties 
similar to those of an exit followed by depreciation. The change of law carries 
no adverse effects, as the central objective of the law, the maintenance of the 
currency’s value, is not violated. The legal hurdles imposed by the currency 
board are meant to prevent surprise devaluations, and as such can be 
overcome without damage in the case of appreciation. 
A soft exit with the goal of appreciation of the domestic currency will 
probably become public well before the respective legal change. This will 
attract capital inflows, which potentially can undermine the appreciation 
strategy, as foreign reserves may cease to provide full backing of the 
expanded monetary base at the intended new exchange rate. In any event, an 
                                     
186 See Balino/Enoch (1997), pp. 26-7. 
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appreciation increases the value of the currency board’s liabilities in relation to 
its assets, which causes losses for the currency board. 
Again, a controlled and gradual upward crawl of the currency can be 
introduced to mitigate these problems by gradually allowing domestic interest 
rates to decrease and to keep capital inflows at bay187. 
7.2.4 Switch to a Floating Exchange Rate 
The switch to a floating exchange rate regime is most appropriate when 
the domestic currency is undervalued, especially where the pressure to 
appreciate is not too large. The switch to a float can be taken in steps, so as 
to allow initially the exchange rate to float within a band that can be widened 
gradually or be defined as a crawling band. 
In cases of strong depreciation pressure, however, the switch to a float is 
unequally more dangerous, as it bears the risk of loss of the nominal anchor 
and of accelerating devaluation and inflation. 
7.2.5 Switch in the Peg 
Another exit option consists in the change of the anchor currency. In 
changing to a reserve currency that is expected to depreciate vis-à-vis the 
main trading partners’ currencies, a currency board can realize (provided 
these expectations materialize) a desired real effective depreciation of its 
currency (and vice versa for the case of a desired real effective 
appreciation)188. Destabilizing capital flows can largely be prevented when the 
switch occurs at the relevant market cross exchange rates at the time of its 
implementation. However, the structure of domestic interest rates will change 
with the new anchor currency, which is likely to bear some real costs, and 
                                     
187 See Balino/Enoch (1997), p. 25. 
188 See the proposal of a dual currency board, described in the next section, where peg 
switches are intended ex ante to occur automatically as soon as a cross exchange rate 
defined by the currency board is reached. The pre-determination of peg switches makes 
them seem like a special kind of built-in escape clause, under avoidance of possibly 
destabilizing effects. 
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possibly have an adverse impact on capital flows. These costs have to be 
weighed against the expected future benefits in terms of avoided distortions in 
the real exchange rate. The reliance on mere expectations of nominal 
exchange rate movements, however, makes this strategy a risky one. 
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8 Dual Currency Boards: An Extended Proposal for Currency 
Stability 
One interesting extension to the currency board idea deserves special 
attention: the proposal for so-called dual currency boards, brought forward by 
S.E. Oppers189. It shall be briefly sketched here in order to show how some of 
the drawbacks of the currency board idea can – so far only in theory – be 
avoided. 
The idea is derived from the ancient experience with the gold and silver-
based bimetallic monetary system, which dominated monetary constitutions 
from the Renaissance until the 19th century (when it was replaced by the gold 
standard). Under bimetallism, gold and silver competed for dominance with 
the effect that, according to Gresham’s Law, “bad money” drove out the “good 
money”, and so prevailed as the circulating medium. While the system of 
competing specie was sometimes condemned as fundamentally unstable, the 
quality of the system to bring about quick and automatic changes in the peg 
constitutes the main advantage for the dual currency board. 
The idea underlying the dual currency board idea is to extend the promise 
of convertibility to a second reserve currency, with the convertibility guarantee 
always subject to the availability of the respective currency in the reserves of 
the currency board. If one of the reserve currencies is not available, 
convertibility of the domestic currency in the other reserve currency is 
guaranteed. A shortage of the currency board of one of the reserve currencies 
is not to be seen as weakening the currency board’s credibility, but on the 
contrary reflects the stabilizing mechanism of the dual currency board as will 
be described with the following example. 
Assume a country’s currency is convertible by law into either one dollar or 
one euro. The rates of 1 unit of domestic currency per 1 dollar or 1 euro are 
the official “currency board rates”. Total reserves can consist of one or both of 
                                     
189 See Oppers (2000). 
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the reserve currencies and always provide full coverage for domestic notes in 
circulation, valued at the currency board rates. At all times, conversion into 
one of the reserve currencies is guaranteed at the currency board rates. The 
currency board’s activities include nothing that exceeds “orthodox” currency 
board activities: it only buys and sells both reserve currencies at the defined 
currency board rates upon demand and thus behaves completely passive. 
This frame yields an interesting mechanism, which Oppers illustrates with the 
help of the empirical development of the dollar and euro exchange rates 
during 1999 and 2000. 
In January 1999, the market exchange rate of the euro was $1,17. With 
the defined currency board rates of 1 euro = 1 dollar = 1 unit of domestic 
currency, the euro is undervalued in the domestic monetary system, which is 
why the currency board cannot hold or retain any euros: they would quickly be 
acquired by arbitrageurs at the currency board rate and profitably sold at the 
market rate. The reserves of the currency board therefore solely consist of 
dollars, therefore making the convertibility guarantee operational only with 
respect to the dollar. The domestic currency is effectively pegged to the dollar. 
The dollar’s appreciation during 1999 stays without effect as long as the 
dollar-euro parity is not reached. However, when the market exchange rate of 
1 euro declines to below 1 dollar (as happened at the beginning of 2000), it 
gets profitable for arbitrageurs to buy dollars from the currency board, sell 
them in the exchange market at the market rate against euros and sell those 
euros to the currency board against domestic currency, so realizing a riskless 
profit. As long as arbitrage processes are taking place, the deviation of the 
market exchange rate from parity will remain small as the currency board 
continues selling dollars. During this process, the mechanism enhances 
exchange rate stability in the region of the defined parity. 
When dollar reserves are sold, however, and the reserves of the currency 
board solely consist of euros, the change of anchor currency has taken place 
and the domestic currency is effectively pegged to the euro. It is important to 
stress that this switch in the peg is purely the effect of the dual convertibility 
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guarantee and of rationally acting currency traders. It happens completely 
automatically and without intervention of any authority. Also, the currency 
board does not incur any loss as a result of the switch, since its reserves are 
always valued in domestic currency at the currency board rates. It can be 
argued that the currency board forgoes capital gains by leaving arbitrage 
opportunities to private traders, but there is no reason why the currency board 
should not realize those gains itself as soon as the respective cross exchange 
rate is crossed. 
The beneficent effect of this switch is that the domestic currency is always 
pegged to the relatively more depreciated currency – in the same way as 
Gresham’s law predicts that “cheap” reserves drive out “expensive” reserves. 
The crucial relation is that between the market exchange rate and the 
currency board rate of dollars per euro. This relation decides over which of the 
reserve currencies is the “relatively more depreciated” one and therefore over 
the effective peg. 
This mechanism invalidates one of the main arguments against currency 
boards. The much feared real overvaluation of the domestic currency as a 
result of an appreciating reserve currency, with its detrimental effects on the 
real economy, is avoided by making sure that the domestic currency is always 
pegged to the relatively more depreciated of two reserve currencies190. With 
respect to the criteria for the choice of reserve currency, this advantage of the 
dual currency board over the traditional form becomes prominent: under 
today’s ever more diversified trade patterns, the choice of more than one 
reserve currency can mirror existing trade patterns to a higher degree. If, as in 
the above example, foreign trade of the currency board country is split 
approximately evenly between the euro area and the United States, the 
                                     
190 As Oppers notes, the idea can theoretically also be extended to three or more 
reserve currencies, as well as to a basket of reserve currencies. While in this way existing 
trade patterns could be reflected even better and the real exchange rate could be kept 
more stable, the lack of transparency and rising transaction costs (as well as more likely 
reweightings over time) render such options less desirable. 
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choice of the euro and the dollar as reserve currencies provides a better 
insurance against imported appreciation and loss of international 
competitiveness than would be the case with a single reserve currency. 
Possible concerns about inflationary impacts of always pegging to the 
relatively more depreciated currency can be largely neglected, as long as the 
choice of reserve currencies has been made out of a set of stable currencies. 
It has to be borne in mind that the description of a currency as the “relatively 
more depreciated” one does not mean that it is constantly depreciating. On 
the contrary, if the cross rate implicit in the peg is near the point where it 
reflects something like long-term purchasing power parity, and if both reserve 
countries follow similar anti-inflationary policies, the reserve currency cross 
rate will oscillate around the currency board cross rate, and the opposite 
effects tend to cancel out over time191. 
The effects of a dual currency board on interest rates are governed by the 
fact that a switch of peg also effectuates a switch of interest rate connectivity. 
As Oppers shows, the relatively more depreciated (hence the reserve) 
currency will always have a higher interest rate than the relatively less 
depreciated currency. This is the result of the implicit structure of the 
convertibility guarantee (which, in fact, incorporates “call options” for the 
reserve currency192). Nevertheless, a dual currency board country’s interest 
rates need not be higher than they would be under a “simple” currency board 
regime, as the risk premium on the domestic currency should be lower under 
a dual currency board, reflecting the relatively lower risk of real overvaluation 
and ensuing credibility loss. 
As becomes clear, the choice of the currency board cross rate is central 
because it decides over the probable timing and frequency of peg switches. It 
should optimally be set at an “equilibrium” rate, at which neither of the reserve 
                                     
191 Oppers has substantiated this assumption with empirical evidence for a 
hypothetical dual currency board with the dollar and the euro as reserve currencies in the 
period from 1979 to 2000. See pp. 8 and 20. 
192 See Oppers (2000), p. 9. 
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currencies is significantly over- or undervalued vis-à-vis the other and – 
implicitly – vis-à-vis the domestic currency. Additional considerations could 
lead to the decision to define the currency board rate at a level at which the 
domestic currency would probably be pegged most of the time to one of the 
two reserve currencies. In this way, a switch in peg could still avoid the worst 
degrees of overvaluation, while apart from that the domestic economy could 
stay with the (preferred) peg throughout acceptable movements in 
valuation193. Equally, the currency board rates could be realigned at any time, 
e.g. by adapting one of the conversion rates to long-term real exchange rate 
developments, in order to correct relations which have initially been set at 
unfavourable levels. 
As mentioned above, ongoing arbitrage processes during the switch in 
peg enhance exchange rate stability in the region of the currency board cross 
rate194. While the global exchange rate stabilizing influence of one single dual 
currency board should not be overestimated, the possibility of various 
countries establishing dual currency boards reveals further potentials: in 
pooling their reserves, co-ordinated dual currency boards (setting currency 
board rates at identical or slightly different implicit cross rates) could 
contribute significantly to global currency stability195.  
In sum, the dual currency board idea provides an interesting and 
convincing way to avoid one of the most important weaknesses of an 
orthodox currency board. Significant and lasting real overvaluation of the 
                                     
193 Such a strategy could be envisaged for “dollarized” countries, i.e. where the 
economy is already significantly penetrated by one of the reserve currencies. See Oppers 
(2000), pp. 9-10. 
194 This is brought about not only by the arbitrage processes themselves (a directly 
stabilising effect) but also by the anticipation of rational investors who expect them when 
the market cross rate approaches the currency board rate, and behave accordingly 
(indirect effect). See Oppers (2000), pp. 10-1. 
195 Again, there is an encouraging historical parallel with bimetallism. See Oppers 
(2000), p. 12. 
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domestic currency and the connected economic costs can be largely 
prevented through a simple and transparent extension of the currency board 
rule – the addition of an alternative reserve currency. In addition to the 
beneficent effects on the local economy, obtained by completely market-
conform and non-interventionist mechanisms, a dual currency board exerts a 
stabilizing effect on exchange rates, which even could be maximised when 
several countries adopted and co-ordinated the system. Against the argument 
that the system could be considered more complicated and hence less 
credible than a traditional currency board stands the historical experience with 
bimetallism which shows that its functioning can be well understood by the 
public and provide stability over long periods. 
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